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 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
INTRODUCTION:  The Division of Developmental Services (DDD), within Colorado’s 
Department of Human Services (the “Department”), administers three 1915(c) Medicaid waiver 
programs providing home and community based services to persons with developmental 
disabilities.  Central to the delivery of these services is the community centered board (CCB), 
which plays multiple roles in connecting people to needed services.  Over the past two decades, a 
variety of stakeholders have objected to the role of the CCBs and the potential for conflict of 
interest.  More recently, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) and the Office of 
the State Auditor have inquired about the potential for conflict of interest, with CMS expressing 
concern that the Department implement more safeguards or alter the role of the CCB.  In 
response to these concerns, DDD asked the Muskie School to assist in defining appropriate 
safeguards and protections related to potential conflicts of interests arising from the multiple 
roles of community centered boards.    
This document summarizes the information we gathered, our analysis of potential conflicts of 
interest, and recommendations for addressing opportunities for improvement. The information 
we gathered is based on document review, input from stakeholders, and a review of practices in 
four other states.  See the APPENDICES for more detail on these sources of information.  Our 
findings are a “point-in-time” view of the policies and infrastructure in place and may not reflect 
some of the many reforms recently or soon to be implemented in the Department.   
THE ROLES OF THE CCB:  The CCB is at the center of the delivery system.  CCBs are private 
non-profit organizations.  Colorado statute designates the CCB as the single entry point to the 
long-term service and support system for persons with developmental disabilities within a 
designated service area.  Colorado currently contracts with 20 CCBs, with each CCB serving a 
non-overlapping geographic region of one to ten counties and from 90 to 1,800 individuals each.   
The CCB plays a series of central roles: 
? Single Point of Entry (SPOE):  As the SPOE for developmental disability services and 
supports, the CCB provides information and referral, determines eligibility for services, 
and manages waiting lists.   
? Case Management Agency:  In this role, the CCB develops individualized plans (IPs), 
manages the provider selection process, and advocates on behalf of the participant.   
? Organized Health Care Delivery System (or Provider Contractor):  An OHCDS provides 
a mechanism for reimbursing providers without requiring every provider to enter into a 
Provider Agreement with the Medicaid agency.  As an OHCDS, the CCB is responsible 
for services provided through subcontracted providers.  Providers can benefit from 
participating in an OHCDS because the CCB can provide a steady cash flow and reduce 
financial risk connected to unexpected costs.  In return, a CCB can set rates for services, 
permitting the CCB to pay a provider more or less for a service than the CCB receives 
from Medicaid.  Provider agencies are not required to participate in an OHCDS.  
Providers who do not participate in the OHCDS can still bill through the CCB or can bill 
Medicaid directly.   
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 ? Service Provider:  Under statute, the CCB is authorized to act as a direct service 
provider.  Almost all CCBs do provide direct services.  The CCB is often the only major 
service provider in rural areas.     
Embedded in these roles are two others: 
? Quality Assurance:  In its capacity as case management agency and as an OHCDS, the 
CCB plays several quality assurance roles.  It monitors IP implementation; it reviews the 
overall quality of services and supports provided in its service area; it provides access to 
the complaint system; and it addresses allegations of abuse, mistreatment and neglect,  
? Overseeing Provider Entry:  Recent policy changes have significantly reduced the role of 
the CCB in overseeing provider entry.  Under the new policy, the CCB reviews a service 
agency’s application for completeness and makes recommendations to DDD for approval 
or disapproval.  As part of its review, the CCB makes a site visit for a new group home or 
facility-based day program.  Once approved to provide a specific service, a provider 
agency can provide that service in other parts of the State without obtaining further 
approval.  
The chart below depicts an OVERVIEW OF CCB ROLES.   
 
Overview of CCB’s Roles 
 
 
 
CCB 
SPOE CM Provider 
Contracts
DDD 
Direct 
Service 
 
 
IDENTIFYING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST:  A “conflict of interest” is a “real or seeming 
incompatibility between one’s private interests and one’s public or fiduciary duties.”1  A CCB’s 
public duty is defined by statute, regulation and contract.  As an agent of the State, the CCB has a 
                                                 
1  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, Eighth Ed., Thomson West, St Paul, MN (2004). 
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 duty to adhere to and promote the Department’s programmatic goals for quality, here defined to 
be: 
Every person meeting the State’s eligibility criteria for developmental disability services 
has equitable access to services that meet individual needs and preferences, are consistent 
with federal and state law, and are within existing resources. 
The CCB’s private interests are those natural to any business (including any other provider) 
interested in its own survival in a competitive environment.  In particular, the CCB has an 
interest in maximizing revenue (e.g., by increasing the number of people it serves and the 
amount it is paid for services), minimizing costs (e.g., minimizing the costs associated with 
meeting the needs of the people it serves), and improving its competitive position relative to 
others (e.g., promoting awareness of its service).   
The CCB’s private interests may be in conflict with its public duty in a variety of ways.  For 
example, to minimize costs, a CCB might have an incentive to avoid serving more costly 
individuals.  Acting on that incentive would be adverse to its duty to promote equitable access to 
services.   
A CCB is not unique in having public duties and private interests in potential conflict.  However, 
because of the multiple roles a CCB plays, there is naturally a greater opportunity for role 
confusion for a CCB, as well as more opportunity for a CCB to act on its private interests.  The 
table on the next page, A CCB’S OPPORTUNITIES TO ACT ON PRIVATE INTERESTS AS A DIRECT 
SERVICE PROVIDER, identifies: 
? The different roles the CCB plays and the functions performed as part of those roles.  
? The CCB’s public duty in fulfilling its role.  
? The CCB’s private interest as a provider that might be in conflict with its duty.   
? A listing of some of the ways a CCB could act on its private interests as a service 
provider (without drawing conclusions about whether it does) when performing its 
functions in other roles.        
Our conclusions about the existence of these opportunities are based on our understanding of 
how the delivery system works, which we have developed through document review and 
stakeholder interviews.2  We have also relied on stakeholder input to get a better understanding 
of how a conflict might play out, if acted upon by a CCB.  For the purpose of this analysis, we do 
not draw conclusions about whether one or several or all CCBs act upon a conflict, only whether 
or not a CCB has an incentive and opportunity to do so. 
                                                 
2  See the appendices for a listing of REFERENCE DOCUMENTS and SUMMARY OF STAKEHOLDER INPUT. 
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A CCB’S OPPORTUNITIES TO ACT ON PRIVATE INTERESTS AS A DIRECT SERVICE PROVIDER 
Other CCB Role CCB’s Public Duty as 
Agent of State 
CCB’s Private 
Interest as 
Provider 
Opportunities to Act on 
Private Interests 
Single Entry Point 
? I&R 
? Eligibility 
Determination 
? Managing  Waiting 
List 
? Allow choice of 
provider 
? Ensure equitable 
access. 
? Gain competitive 
advantage 
? Minimize costs 
? Maximize revenue 
? Publicize CCB services, but not 
other service providers to limit 
access to information about other 
service providers? 
? Loosen interpretation of 
eligibility criteria and level of 
care to fill available provider 
slots? 
? Use eligibility criteria to screen 
out high cost users? 
? Move people up on the waiting 
list who match openings in CCB 
provider agencies? 
Case Management 
Agency 
? Service Planning 
? Provider Selection 
? Allow choice of 
provider 
? Ensure equitable 
access 
? Gain competitive 
advantage 
? Minimize costs 
? Maximize revenue 
? Develop service plans that favor 
CCB services? 
? Use service planning or provider 
selection process to steer 
participants toward CCB services 
in order to fill open service slots? 
? Use the provider selection 
process to steer low cost 
participants to CCB services & 
high costs participants to other 
providers?? 
OHCDS ? Allow choice of 
provider 
? Gain competitive 
advantage 
? Maximize revenue 
? Negotiate low rates with other 
providers, while offering 
favorable rates to own provider 
agencies?* 
Quality Assurance 
? Monitoring Services 
 
? Complaints 
 
? Incidents 
? Assure provider/ 
service quality 
? Gain competitive 
advantage 
? Minimize costs 
? Suppress complaints against 
CCB? 
? Suppress incidents connected to 
CCB? 
? Less rigorous monitoring of CCB 
services; resistance to 
interventions? 
? Less rigorous advocacy on behalf 
of participant or family? 
                                                 
? With the introduction of standardized rates, the Department expects the opportunity for conflict here to fade. 
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 EXISTING SAFEGUARDS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT:  Having identified the range 
of opportunities a CCB has to act on its private interests as a provider, when performing its other 
public duties, we reviewed DDD’s existing strategies for mitigating these opportunities.   
Our analysis focuses on: 
? Safeguards:  Here defined as a policy, procedure or system that works to deter a CCB 
from acting contrary to the goals of the program.  In evaluating existing safeguards, we 
assessed whether the safeguard adequately addresses the potential conflict and whether 
there are barriers to the effectiveness of the safeguard.   
? Discovery Methods:  It is not enough to define a policy or procedure.  The Department 
must design and implement methods for assessing a CCB’s performance against the 
standards on an ongoing basis.  Is there a method to assess the effectiveness of the 
safeguard in eliminating or reducing the conflict (e.g., oversight method)?   
? Design Features:  Design features include roles, responsibilities and organizational 
structures that either produce or eliminate the potential for conflict. Changes to program 
design features may be warranted where no effective safeguards exist, where there are 
substantial barriers to their effectiveness, or where oversight methods are weak or 
unavailable to confirm that the safeguard is working.   
The formal safeguards we analyzed build on the most obvious and effective safeguard against 
any conflict:  the professional, personal and contractual commitment of the CCB to program 
goals and the pursuit of quality outcomes for participants.  Reports from many stakeholders 
suggest that this safeguard is present and leads to very positive experiences within the CCB.  We 
also heard that the CCB’s multiple and blurred roles can undermine the effectiveness of this 
safeguard or confidence that it is working.   
In general, our analysis showed a number of opportunities for improvement and proposed a 
number of enhanced safeguards and some design options.  This analysis is documented in the full 
report, EXISTING SAFEGUARDS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT.   
 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:  To address the opportunities for improvement, we 
identify a series of strategies for addressing the conflicts of interest inherent to the existing 
delivery system.  The options we propose would impose varying levels of disruption to the 
existing delivery system, with varying degrees of effectiveness: 
 
? The first set of strategies are the least disruptive to the existing delivery system but are 
also the least likely to effectively safeguard against conflicts of interest.  This set of 
recommendations assumes the CCB continues to play the same roles it does currently but 
would minimize the opportunity for acting on a conflict of interest by imposing standards 
for requiring greater consistency and accountability.    
 
? The second set of strategies considers a range of design options, separating out some of 
the roles currently fulfilled by the CCB.  In all of these options, at a minimum, the direct 
service role is separated from the case management and single entry point role.  These 
design options impose different levels of disruption on the system but are also the most 
likely to be effective at minimizing the potential for a conflict of interest.   
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 ? The third set of strategies is not directly related to the multiple roles played by the CCB 
but have a significant impact on the quality of services.  These issues were surfaced in 
our discussion with stakeholders and information we gathered from other states.  We 
include them here because of their potential benefit to the Department.    
 
Moving forward with any of these strategies must involve careful consideration of the costs and 
consequences relative to the expected benefit.  We heard the same theme from many families: 
“Do not fix a problem for someone else by creating problems for me.  Do not add an extra 
administrative cost that means less money for services.  If it’s not broke, don’t fix it!”   
 
While the Department may be reluctant to disrupt what is working well, it may find compelling 
reasons to do so.  We suggest a balancing test, where any remedy for a conflict is weighed 
against its cost and disruption to the system.  If the scope and severity of a problem is minor, 
ideally the cost and consequence of the remedy should be minor.  However, if the problem has a 
significant negative impact on quality, the cost of the remedy will have more justification.  
Weighing the costs and benefits of the status quo against a proposed remedy involves a range of 
competing priorities.  The Department also needs to balance local control (familiarity and 
responsiveness to the local community) and state level interests in equity, minimizing 
inconsistent and duplicative burden on participants and providers; and compliance with state and 
federal law.  Deciding what weight to give competing priorities is a judgment call,3 ideally based 
on information and stakeholder input.   
                                                 
3 At least where there is discretion.  Compliance with federal or state law, for example, would have greater weight 
than the cost and availability of services. 
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?  INTRODUCTION 
The Division of Developmental Services (DDD), within Colorado’s Department of Human 
Services (the “Department”), administers three 1915(c) Medicaid waiver programs providing 
home and community based services to persons with developmental disabilities.  Medicaid 
funded targeted case management services are also provided to this population group.  Central to 
the delivery of these services is the community centered board (CCB), which plays multiple roles 
in connecting people to needed services.  Over the past two decades, a variety of stakeholders 
have objected to the role of the CCBs and the potential for conflict of interest.  More recently, 
the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) and the Office of the State Auditor have 
inquired about the potential for conflict of interest, with CMS expressing concern that the 
Department implement more safeguards or alter the role of the CCB.  In response to these 
concerns, DDD asked the Muskie School to assist in defining appropriate safeguards and 
protections related to potential conflicts of interest arising from the multiple roles of Community 
Centered Boards.    
As part of our work, we have:  
? Conducted document review 
? Gathered stakeholder input 
? Developed an operational definition of “conflict of interest’ 
? Reviewed approaches used in other states 
? Evaluated existing safeguards and identified opportunities for improvement. 
This document summarizes the information we gathered, our analysis of potential conflicts of 
interest, and recommendations for addressing opportunities for improvement.     
We discuss the information we gathered in the context of our analysis.  Much more detail can be 
found in the reference documents we reviewed (listed in the APPENDICES) and in our SUMMARY 
OF STAKEHOLDER INPUT (also in the APPENDICES).  In particular, the SUMMARY OF 
STAKEHOLDER INPUT provides a much deeper understanding of the range of stakeholder 
perspectives than we document in our analysis.   
This document must be read as a “point-in-time” view of the policies and infrastructure in place.  
The Department is currently moving from quasi-managed care to a fee-for-service 
reimbursement system.  With this reform comes a new standardized assessment tool for 
determining payment rates, a standardized rate schedule, new supporting information systems 
and policies.  In addition, the Department has recently upgraded some of its oversight functions.  
The Department will be submitting waiver renewal applications for its three waivers reflecting 
these changes.    However, at this point in time not all of these changes are documented or 
reflected in program rules.  While this document attempts to reflect changes made subsequent to 
our review, we anticipate that some have been omitted or their potential impact not fully 
captured.    
 ?  DELIVERY SYSTEM OVERVIEW 
This section describes the basic elements of Colorado’s delivery system for persons with 
developmental disabilities. 
Oversight and Direction of Developmental Services 
DDD provides leadership for the direction, funding and operation of services for persons with 
developmental disabilities.  DDD serves through its Medicaid and state funded programs a total 
of approximately 12,400 adults and children with developmental disabilities.  
DDD partners with the Colorado Department of Health Care Policy and Financing (HCPF), the 
state Medicaid agency, to develop policy for DDD services funded through Medicaid.  As the 
designated single state Medicaid agency, HCPF is responsible to CMS for assuring that 
Medicaid-funded services comply with federal requirements.  HCPF is responsible for 
overseeing DDD’s administration of its Medicaid funded programs.   
Home and Community Based Waivers 
DDD administers three waiver programs for persons with developmental disabilities:   
Comprehensive Services Waiver (HCB-DD)   
Comprehensive waiver services serve those adults who require extensive supports to live safely 
(including access to 24-hour supervision) and who do not have other sources for meeting those 
needs.  Services available under the HCB-DD waiver include individual and group residential 
services and supports, day services and employment services.  Currently, HCB-DD services 
cannot be provided in the family home. The service agency is responsible for the living 
environment, which it may own or is owned by the individual or a “host home,” also known as 
adult foster care.  Approximately 3,790 adults currently receive services under this waiver.  The 
number of Medicaid-funded resources for comprehensive waiver services is 3,806 (with 66 state-
funded resources).  
Supported Living Services (SLS)   
The Supported Living Services waiver provides assistance and support to meet daily living and 
safety needs of persons who are responsible for their own living arrangements in the community.  
Services are intended to augment available supports for those adults who either can live 
independently with limited supports or who, if they need extensive support, are getting that 
support from other sources, such as their family.  DDD Rule 16.611.  Services available under 
the SLS waiver include personal assistance, day services and employment services. SLS services 
can be provided in the family home.  Approximately 2,676 adults currently receive services 
under this waiver.  The number of Medicaid-funded resources for supported living waiver 
services is 2,892 (with 692 state-funded resources).   
 
Children’s Extensive Services (CES)   
Children’s Extensive Services provide enhanced in-home supports for those children considered 
to be most in need because of the severity of the disability.  CES services are intended to provide 
for the stability of the family setting in order to allow the child to continue to remain in the 
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 home.  Approximately 323 children currently receive services under this waiver.  The number of 
Medicaid-funded resources for children’s extensive services and supports is 395. 
Providers 
Services under these three waivers are provided through CCBs, direct service providers, and 
Regional Centers.  The role of each type of provider is described below: 
Community Centered Boards (CCBs)   
The CCB is at the center of the delivery system.  CCBs first emerged in the 1960s in response to 
parents and advocates seeking alternatives to institutional services for children with 
developmental disabilities.  CCBs are private non-profit organizations.  Colorado statute 
designates the CCB as the single entry point to the long-term service and support system for 
persons with developmental disabilities within a designated service area.  27-10.5-102. C.R.S.  
CCB designation is for a 12-month period.  DDD reviews a CCB’s application for designation, 
evaluating the CCB based on a range of factors, including how well the CCB has encouraged 
competition.  DDD is required to purchase service and support coordination services through the 
CCB, except under specified conditions relating to the CCB’s failure to provide or purchase the 
service, or because of poor quality.  27-10.5-104 C.R.S.   DDD regulations govern the process 
when DDD chooses to purchase services without involving the CCB.  DDD Rule 16.225.   
Colorado currently contracts with 20 CCBs, with each CCB serving a non-overlapping 
geographic region of one to ten counties and from 90 to 1,800 individuals each.  Resources for 
services are allocated to each service area based on historical experience and the legislative 
process.  DDD Rule 16.226.  In addition, some CCBs supplement state funding with mil-levy 
funding, dedicated funding collected from local taxes.    
Service Agencies   
Service agencies are defined to include “individual service agencies” (i.e., an individual person 
under contract with a CCB or another service agency); “developmental disabilities service 
agencies,” which provide services predominantly to persons with developmental disabilities; and 
“typical community service agencies,” which provide services predominantly for persons 
without developmental disabilities.  DDD Rule 16.221.  With the approval of the DDD, both the 
developmental disabilities service agencies and the “typical community service agencies” can 
provide comprehensive (residential) services.  These service agencies can also provide in-home 
supports under the SLS or CES waiver (and in the case of “typical” service agencies, a variety of 
other services and supports).  The “individual service agencies” would include in-home support 
providers providing services under the SLS or CES waiver.  
Regional Centers (RCs)   
Regional Centers are essentially state operated and licensed intermediate care facilities for 
persons with mental retardation (ICFs-MR), providing waiver services to persons with 
developmental disabilities having the most intensive needs.  Access to RC services is through the 
CCB.  A Referral and Placement Committee within each service area is responsible for 
reviewing and recommending a placement in a RC.  Criteria limit referral to a RC to those 
instances when all reasonable alternatives have been exhausted.  Prior to the person entering the 
RC for long-term placement, an order from a district court is required (although there are some 
residents that were voluntarily admitted to the RC many years ago.)  RCs provide a number of 
3                         Muskie School of Public Service 
 waiver services including: 24-hour supervision, residential services, day programming, 
habilitation, medical, training and behavioral intervention, plus short-term emergency/crisis 
support to the community system.  RC case managers provide case management for all persons 
receiving waiver services at the RC, although CCBs will be taking over this role in the coming 
months.  Colorado has three RCs (Grand Junction, Pueblo and Wheat Ridge).  All three are 
under the direct administrative authority of DDD, with state employees providing services. 
 
?  THE MULTIPLE ROLES OF THE CCB 
The CCB plays, or can play, a wide range of roles in the DD delivery system, including: 
? Serving as the single entry point for DD services  
? Providing case management services  
? Providing direct services    
? Serving as an Organized Health Care Delivery System (or provider contractor) 
 
Embedded in these roles are two others: 
 
? Overseeing the provider entry process 
? Assuring the quality of services and providers  
 
Each of these roles is described below.  Please refer to the Summary of Stakeholder Input for a 
better understanding of the nature of these roles and how they are experienced by different 
people.   
 
 
Overview of CCB Roles 
 
 
CCB 
SPOE CM Provider 
Contracts
DDD 
Direct 
Service  
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 The CCB’s Role as Single Point of Entry 
As the designated Single Point of Entry (SPOE), the CCB performs a number of functions.   
 
Colorado statute gives the CCB responsibility for cultivating services in its catchment area: 
 
? The CCB is required to annually submit a long-range plan to address the needs of the people 
in its service area.  The annual plan is to be developed through “collaborative community 
efforts, facilitated by the CCB, and shall include an annual public forum.”  DDD Rule 
16.210. 
 
? DDD rules require that the CCB: use existing service agencies, social networks and natural 
sources of support; encourage competition; and establish new services and supports for the 
prevention of institutionalization.  DDD Rule 16.210.  The CCB’s performance on this 
standard is to be assessed as part of the CCB’s annual application for redesignation as a 
CCB.  
 
A number of stakeholders discussed the role of the CCB as the community “face” for 
developmental disability services.  It is readily identifiable as a resource and community partner 
for addressing issues affecting persons with DD. 
 
In addition to its community role, the CCB has responsibility for a range of individualized 
services including information and referral, eligibility determination and managing the waiting 
list for services.   
Information and Referral 
The CCB has responsibility for providing information about available services, including public 
and private services, and state and local services, supports and resources.  DDD Rule 16.410.  
Many parents identified the important role a CCB can play in this capacity, particularly for 
parents who have just learned that their child has a disability and do not know where to start.  
Eligibility Determination for DD Services 
The CCB is responsible for determining whether or not an individual has a developmental 
disability, within the State’s definition of that term.  This process is governed under DDD Rule 
16.420.  Each CCB is required to have a Referral and Placement Committee to determine when 
an individual has a developmental disability and to make referrals for Medicaid waiver services.  
DDD Rule 16.450.  An individual can appeal the determination under the CCB’s complaint and 
grievance process.  DDD Rule 16.420.    
Eligibility Determination for Medicaid Waiver Services 
The CCB determines whether a person is eligible for home and community based services under 
the HCBS-DD waiver.  Specifically, the CCB determines  if the person has a developmental 
disability as defined in HCPF Medical Assistance Staff Manual, 8.761.1, and administers the 
ULTC 100.2, the standardized assessment used to determine level of care (LOC) and individual 
needs.  HCPF Medical Assistance Staff Manual, 8.401.17.     The LOC assessment is used to 
determine whether HCBS-DD waiver services are an appropriate option. HCPF Medical 
Assistance Staff Manual, 8.405.32.  An individual has a right to appeal this determination.  
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 HCPF Medical Assistance Staff Manual, 8.401.204 and 8.057. The LOC determination is also 
used to determine the level of services an individual can receive under the HCBS-DD waiver.  
HCPF Medical Assistance Staff Manual, 8.403.  These determinations can also be appealed.  
HCPF Medical Assistance Staff Manual, 8.402.53 and 8.057.   
Managing Waiting Lists for Services 
The CCB is required to establish a waiting list for services and supports for people eligible for 
services but for whom funding is not available.  The waiting list is to be maintained in 
accordance with DDD guidelines and HCPF policies.  DDD Rule 16.450.   The CCB submits 
waiting list data to a database maintained by DDD.  The CCB must manage the waiting list 
according to the immediacy of the need for services:  as soon as available, safety net (i.e., if 
current supports are lost or change), or by a specific date (e.g., turn 21, graduation).  Individuals 
and families must be made aware of their waiting list status and any changes that would affect 
the length of wait.  DDD guidelines also define date of placement on the waiting list.  It is up to 
the CCB to decide whether to consider the service needs of someone already receiving services 
before a person not receiving services. The guidelines specify exceptions to the “First Come First 
Served” rule including:  the person is homeless, in an abusive or neglectful situation, a danger to 
others, or a danger to him or herself.  When the pool of available funds do not permit the next 
person on the waiting list to be served, or under other circumstances, the CCB can ask for an 
exception to First Come First Served.  Also, if a resource becomes available because a person is 
placed in a RC, a person from the RC must be placed in the community.  A person has a right to 
dispute a CCB’s management of the waiting list.  DDD Guidelines for Management of Waiting 
Lists.   
 
As a service agency, the CCB has the authority to determine to whom they will or will not 
provide direct services; however, before a person can be denied services the CCB needs to 
document that services have been sought and that there is no willing provider to provide the 
needed service.  Directive Memorandum to CCB Directors, DDD, March 27, 2001.   
CCB’s Role as Case Management Provider 
As case management provider, the CCB has a number of other responsibilities, including 
developing individualized plans, managing the provider selection process, advocating for the 
people they serve, and overseeing implementation of the individualized plan. 
Developing Individualized Plans  
The CCB is responsible for developing individualized plans (IPs), in coordination with an 
interdisciplinary team (IDT).  DDD Rule 16.440.  The IDT includes the person receiving 
services, the parent or guardian, and others as determined by the needs and preferences of the 
individual.  DDD Rule 16.16.120.  Currently, DDD does not prescribe a specific tool for 
assessing an individual’s service needs and resources.  The IP must document the individual’s 
strengths, preferences, desires and needs; the services and supports appropriate to meet needs; 
the planning process; IP goals; authorized services and supports funded by DDD, in sufficient 
detail so provider agencies have a clear understanding of expected responsibilities and 
performance. DDD Rule 16.440.   
 
The DDD is currently implementing the Supports Intensity Scale (SIS) to measure the frequency, 
intensity and volume of support that individuals need; funding allocations will be linked to this 
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 measurement.  The CCBs are administering the SIS; DDD monitors the results for conformance 
with an expected pattern.   
Managing the Provider Selection Process  
For comprehensive waiver services, the CCB is responsible for developing and implementing a 
process for selecting service agencies to meet the needs and preferences of individuals seeking 
services.  The CCB is required to provide information concerning all existing agencies approved 
to provide comprehensive services.   If the person knows which service agency they wish to 
choose, they may do so.4 If the person does not have a preference, the CCB must notify 
approved and prospective service agencies and solicit their interest.  For those agencies 
expressing interest, the CCB issues an RFP profiling the individual and the anticipated services
and supports to be provided.  The CCB is to evaluate all proposals submitted in response to the 
RFP, including its own, according to the same criteria.  Those approved by the CCB are offered
as options to the person seeking services.  DDD Rule 16.228.  Upon request, the person c
review those proposals not selected b
 
 
an 
y the CCB. 
                                                
 
For SLS services, a participant or the participant’s family has the freedom to choose providers 
from approved service agencies.5  DDD Rule 16.227.    
Advocating for Participants and Families  
The CCB must identify who within the CCB will assist a person in filing a complaint or 
grievance.  DDD Rule 16.326.  The case manager is responsible for promoting a person’s ability 
to engage in self-advocacy.  DDD Rule 16.460.  In addition, under the Medicaid rule for 
Targeted Case Management, case management includes advocating on behalf of their clients to 
access the services and support programs identified in their individualized plan.  HCPF Medical 
Assistance Staff Manual, 8.761.14.  
The CCB’s Role as Service Provider 
The CCB is also authorized to act as a direct service provider.  27-10.5-104. C.R.S.   Almost all 
CCBs do provide services.  In rural parts of Colorado, the CCB may be the only service provider.  
One CCB executive reported that his CCB became a service provider only because it had 
previously been “held hostage” by service providers when negotiating over rates and placement. 
Other CCB representatives that we talked to said that, if forced to choose, they see themselves as 
a direct service provider before they are a case management agency.   
The CCB’s Role as Organized Health Care Delivery System (OHCDS) 
The CCB can also operate as an Organized Health Care Delivery System (OHCDS). Pursuant to 
a CMS policy statement made in a letter to State Medicaid Directors (dated December 20, 1993), 
an OHCDS provides at least one Medicaid service directly but also contracts with other qualified 
providers to furnish other covered services.  An OHCDS provides a mechanism for reimbursing 
providers without requiring every provider to enter into a Provider Agreement with the Medicaid 
agency; this mechanism is helpful where a state wants to promote the use of non-traditional 
 
4 Although DDD rules currently condition an individual’s choice of provider on the CCB’s approval, DDD reports 
that this requirement is no longer operative under the new standard fee structure.  Communication from Matthew 
Solano, October 2007. 
5 Again, DDD rules condition individual choice on DDD concurrence; DDD reports this requirement is no longer 
operative under the new standard fee structure.   
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 providers (e.g., a housecleaning or laundry service) or individual providers, such as family 
member or neighbor providing personal assistance services.   
 
The OHCDS is responsible for the services provided by the subcontracted provider.  42 CFR 
434.6(c).  Providers can benefit from participating in an OHCDS because the CCB can provide a 
steady cash flow and reduce financial risk connected to unexpected costs (e.g., costs associated 
with a psychiatric crisis or an adaptation not reimbursable under Medicaid).  In return, a CCB 
can set rates for services, permitting the CCB to pay a provider more or less for a service than the 
CCB receives from Medicaid.   
 
Technically, all CCBs are OHCDSs.  CMS’ Freedom of Choice policy requires that an individual 
seeking services have their choice of any qualified provider who chooses to provide services to 
the individual.  An individual, therefore, cannot be limited to OHCDS providers and approved 
providers are not required to participate in an OHCDS in order to  provide services.  The 
OHCDS is also not required to accepted all providers as part of the OHCDS.  The CCB can 
charge providers fees for processing claims.  
 
The CCB may also act as a business agent for the service provider, i.e., only providing billing 
services for the agency and not fulfilling the other roles that an OHCDS can serve.  
Under the SLS and CES waivers, the CCB serves as the Support Coordinating Agency, and is 
authorized to provide services directly or to sub-contract with other service agencies. DDD Rule 
16.611.  Currently, service agencies must contract with the Support Coordinating Agency to 
provide any waiver services under the SLS and CES waivers.  
 
Thus, provider agencies have three options for billing and payment:  the agency can obtain a 
Medicaid provider number from HCPF and bill Medicaid directly; the agency can subcontract 
with the CCB as part of an Organized Health Care Delivery System; or the agency can use the 
CCB or some other entity as a business agent for billing services. Per CMS requirements, DDD 
and HCPF have taken steps to ensure all service providers are aware that the service agency may 
bill Medicaid directly.  The CCB has a very limited role in monitoring claims payments and 
billings for those service provider agencies billing Medicaid directly, limited only to confirming 
that the person is receiving the services specified in his or her service plan.  
The CCB’s Role in Managing Provider Entry 
Previously, the CCB played a strong role in controlling provider entry into its service area, for all 
developmental services agencies and any typical community service agency planning to provide 
comprehensive services.  DDD Rule 16.222.  The regulations specified minimum criteria for a 
CCB selecting and approving a provider.  A provider had to obtain the approval of the CCB in 
every service area in which it wanted to operate. 
  
Pursuant to a policy directive issued in March 26, 2007, the CCB’s role has been significantly 
reduced.  The CCB reviews a service agency’s application for completeness.  The CCB makes 
recommendations to DDD, to inform DDD’s approval decision.  However, it must document the 
basis for any recommendation to disapprove.  As part of its review, the CCB makes a site visit 
for a new group home or facility-based day program.  Once approved to provide a specific 
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 service, a provider agency can provide that service in other parts of the state without obtaining 
further approval.  
The CCB’s Role in Assuring Service Quality   
In addition to monitoring implementation of an individualized plan, the CCB has several other 
roles connected to quality assurance, including monitoring the overall performance of a service 
provider, responding to complaints, and addressing critical incidents and allegations of abuse and 
neglect.  
 
Monitoring Indiviualized Plan Implementation  
As the case management agency, the CCB is responsible for monitoring the delivery and quality 
of services and supports, the health, safety and welfare of the participant, and the participant’s 
satisfaction with services and choice of service provider.  In addition, the CCB is responsible for 
promoting the individual’s ability to engage in self-determination, self-representation, and self-
advocacy.  DDD Rule 16.460. 
 
Monitoring Overall Provider Performance 
In its capacity as an Organized Health Care Delivery System, the CCB is also responsible for 
reviewing the overall quality of services and supports provided in its service area, including 
general satisfaction with services, general practices of service agencies regarding health, welfare 
and safety of the people it serves, fiscal compliance related to implementing the IP, and the 
nature and frequency of complaints connected to service agency.  DDD Rule 16.460.  DDD 
Program quality standards require each CCB to develop and implement a written CCB 
monitoring plan to describe monitoring activities, frequency, documentation, etc.   
 
Providing Access to a Complaint and Grievance Process  
The CCB is required to have procedures for resolving disputes related to:  a decision that an 
applicant is not eligible for services, a decision to provide, modify, reduce or deny services or 
supports as specified in the IP; a decision to terminate services or supports; and a decision that 
the person receiving services is no longer eligible for services.  DDD Rule 16.322.  The 
grievance is heard by an impartial decision maker.  An “impartial decision maker” is someone 
who has not been directly involved in the specific decision at issue and may be a CCB executive 
director.  The duties of the impartial decision maker are defined; the impartial decision maker 
may not talk to either party about the dispute without the other present.  DDD Policy:  
Conducting an Effective Evidentiary Meeting as Part of the Developmental Disabilities System’s 
Dispute Resolution Process. (September 2000).  CCB decisions can be appealed to DDD.  DDD 
Rule, 16.322.  (These dispute resolution processes supplement but are not a prerequisite to an 
individual’s right to a Medicaid fair hearing.)   
 
The CCB is also required to have a process for timely resolution of grievances or complaints.  
DDD provides that use of the grievance procedure will not prejudice a person’s right to services.  
DDD Rule 16.326.    
 
Addressing Incidents and Allegations of Abuse, Mistreatment and Neglect  
The CCB and service agencies are required to have written policies and procedures for timely 
reporting, recording and reviewing of incidents.  Allegations of abuse, mistreatment, neglect, 
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 exploitation, or injuries that require emergency medical treatment or result in death, must be 
reported to the CCB within 24 hours.  DDD Rule 16.580.  In addition, all provider agencies, 
CCBs and Regional Centers are required to report to law enforcement any allegations which may 
indicate a crime has been committed; reports about at-risk adults must be made to the county 
adult protective units.   
 
The CCB is required to establish a Human Rights Committee (HRC) as a third-party mechanism 
for protecting the rights of participants.  The HRC is advisory; it reviews the practices of the 
CCB and service agencies to make sure practices are consistent with protecting participant rights.  
The HRC is required to include two professional persons trained in the application of behavioral 
development techniques, three representatives of persons receiving services, their parents, legal 
guardians or authorized representatives.  No employee or board member of a service agency 
within the CCB’s service area can serve on the HRC.  27-10.5-105.5 C.R.S.   The CCB provides 
staff support to facilitate HRC functions.  DDD Rule 16.550. 
 
 
?  IDENTIFYING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 
 
Defining Conflict of Interest 
 
A “conflict of interest” is a “real or seeming incompatibility between one’s private interests and 
one’s public or fiduciary duties.”6  A CCB’s “public duty” is defined by statute, regulation and 
contract.  As an agent of the State, the CCB has a duty to adhere to and promote the 
Department’s programmatic goals for quality, here defined to be: 
 
Every person meeting the State’s eligibility criteria for developmental disability services 
has equitable access to services that meet individual needs and preferences, are consistent 
with federal and state law, and are within existing resources. 
 
The CCB’s “private interests” are those natural to any business (including any other provider) 
interested in its own survival in a competitive environment.  In particular, the CCB has an 
interest in maximizing revenue (e.g., by increasing the number of people it serves and the 
amount it is paid for services), minimizing costs (e.g., minimizing the costs associated with 
meeting the needs of the people it serves), and improving its competitive position relative to 
others (e.g., promoting awareness of its service).   
 
The CCB’s private interests may be in conflict with its public duty in a variety of ways.  For 
example, to minimize costs, a CCB might have an incentive to avoid serving more costly 
individuals.  Acting on that incentive would be adverse to its duty to promote equitable access to 
services.     
 
In talking about a conflict of interest, it is important to distinguish between the existence of a 
conflict of interest and whether or not a CCB acts upon that conflict.  Our analysis focuses only 
on the ways in which a CCB’s roles create opportunities for acting on private interests, not 
                                                 
6  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, Eighth Ed., Thomson West, St Paul, MN (2004). 
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 whether a CCB does act upon those interests.  In the next section, EXISTING SAFEGUARDS AND 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT, we will evaluate whether existing safeguards effectively 
prevent a CCB from acting upon a conflict.     
Opportunities to Act on a Conflict of Interest 
A CCB is not unique in having public duties and private interests in potential conflict.  However, 
because of the multiple roles a CCB plays, there is naturally a greater opportunity for role 
confusion for a CCB, as well as more opportunity for a CCB to act on its private interests.  The 
following discussion reviews these multiple roles and the increased opportunity to act on a 
conflict.  Our discussion focuses primarily on the CCB’s private interests as a service provider 
and how that role, when combined with other CCB roles, creates incentives and opportunities to 
act on the CCB’s private interest.  We also briefly discuss how the CCB’s private interests as a 
case management agency or an organized health care delivery system (OHCDS) interacts with 
other roles.   
 
Our conclusions about the existence of these opportunities are based on our understanding of 
how the delivery system works, which we have developed through document review and 
stakeholder interviews.7  We have also relied on stakeholder input to get a better understanding 
of how a conflict might play out, if acted upon by a CCB.  Again, we do not draw any 
conclusions about whether one or several or all CCBs act upon a conflict, only whether or not a 
CCB has an incentive and opportunity to do so.   
The CCB’s Role as Direct Service Provider  
The CCB role creating the most incentive to act on a conflict of interest is the CCB’s role as 
service provider.  The interaction of this role with each of the CCB’s other roles is discussed 
below. 
 
Dual Role:  CCB as Service Provider and Single Point of Entry 
As the single point of entry, the CCB has the opportunity to operate in its self-interest when 
providing information and referral services, determining eligibility for services, and 
managing the waiting list.   
 
As the single entry point, the CCB can create a competitive advantage for itself by providing 
information and referral services that favor its own services over other providers.  Some of 
the ways in which a CCB might fail to adequately perform its information and referral 
obligations because of its conflict of interest:   
 
? Sponsoring informational meetings or publishing newsletters where only the CCB’s 
services are presented or advertised. 
 
? Giving participants and families the option between the CCB’s services or a list of 
providers to sort through on their own, without CCB assistance.  
 
? Failing to provide information about other service providers. 
                                                 
7  See the appendices for a listing of REFERENCE DOCUMENTS and SUMMARY OF STAKEHOLDER INPUT. 
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The CCB can also create a competitive advantage for itself by blurring the distinction 
between its single point of entry and case management roles and its role as service provider 
by using the same name or co-locating services.   
 
In determining eligibility and level of care, a CCB might want to screen out people it finds 
hard to serve or screen in people to fill openings with its service agency.  A CCB’s decisions 
about who should move up on the waiting list could be influenced by who on the waiting list 
might best fit into an opening in the CCB’s service agency.   
 
Dual Role:  CCB as Service Provider and Case Management Agency 
As the case management agency, the CCB has the opportunity to act on its self-interest when 
developing an individualized plan and when overseeing the selection of providers. 
 
When developing the IP, a CCB can steer participants and individuals into CCB services.  
For example, the case manager could refer a person down the hall to the CCB’s provider, or 
the CCB representatives participating in the meeting could offer to provide the services 
during the planning meeting circumventing the need for an RFP process.  The CCB could 
also shape the individualized plan to match the services it has available.   
 
The CCB can use the provider selection process to create a competitive advantage for itself 
and to maximize its revenue and minimize costs.  Some of the ways the CCB could act upon 
these conflicts include: 
? Steering participants to CCB services.  “Steering” could be the result of intentional 
(e.g., questioning a participant’s choice of another provider) or unintentional acts 
(e.g., a case manager is more familiar with the CCB’s services and can offer less 
information about the other options available).   
? Failing to solicit interest from a range of providers.  Failing to fairly evaluate 
proposals submitted by other providers. 
? “Cherry picking” the easier to serve and steering high-cost participants to other 
providers.  
Again, co-location of case management and other services can create a competitive 
advantage for the CCB:  the path of least resistance leads across the hall to the CCB’s 
employment services or day habilitation provider. 
 
Dual Role:  CCB as Organized Health Care Delivery System 
When a CCB is both acting as a provider and is responsible for setting rates as an Organized 
Health Care Delivery System, the CCB has the opportunity to establish rates that are 
favorable to its own service agencies.  (The Department expects this conflict to fade with the 
introduction of standardized rates.) 
 
Dual Role:  CCB as Service Provider and its Quality Assurance Role 
The CCB’s quality assurance functions could be influenced by its role as a provider.   
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 ? When serving as the impartial hearing officer for resolving disputes over access to 
services, or when addressing complaints and grievances, the CCB has the opportunity 
to make decisions that favor its provider agency. 
? The case manager has the opportunity to dissuade or discourage complaints against 
the CCB’s provider agency.   
? The CCB has the opportunity to suppress, minimize, or inadequately address 
incidents, or allegations of abuse, mistreatment, neglect, etc. 
? When monitoring provider and service quality, the CCB has the opportunity to hold 
itself to a lower standard than its competitors.  One case manager described the subtle 
effect of personal relationships developed by working in the same location. “They’re 
in the lunchroom together every day,” making it more difficult for the case 
management side of the CCB to challenge the performance of the provider side. 
 
Dual Role:  CCB as Service Provider and its Role Managing Provider Entry 
Recent policy changes significantly reduce the opportunity for a CCB to limit competition 
from other providers.  We assume that this role has been sufficiently reduced to no longer 
pose a significant opportunity to inappropriately limit provider entry.  
 
The table,  CCB’S OPPORTUNITIES TO ACT ON PRIVATE INTERESTS AS A PROVIDER on the next 
page summarizes the ways in which the CCB’s other roles provide an opportunity for the CCB to 
act on its private interest and against its public duty.      
? The first column identifies the different roles the CCB plays and the functions 
performed as part of those roles.  
? The second column identifies the CCB’s public duty in fulfilling its role.  For 
example, as the single entry point, a CCB has a public duty to ensure equitable access 
to services.   
? The third column identifies the CCB’s private interest as a provider that might be in 
conflict with its duty.  For example, the CCB’s interest in minimizing cost might be 
in conflict with its duty to provide equitable access if it wants to avoid serving high 
cost individuals.   
? The fourth column identifies a range of possible ways a CCB could act on its private 
interests as a service provider (without drawing conclusions about whether it does) 
when performing functions in its other roles.  This list is meant to be illustrative and 
does not represent all of the ways a CCB might act on a conflict, as identified by 
stakeholders.  See the SUMMARY OF STAKEHOLDER INPUT for more.     
The CCB’s Role as Case Management Agency 
As a case management agency, a CCB has a similar set of private interests that, when combined 
with its other roles, also create increased opportunities for the CCB to act on its private interests.  
For example, as both single entry point and case management agency, the CCB can use the 
eligibility determination process to screen out high cost users or reduce the number of people on 
the waiting list.  It can also loosen eligibility criteria to increase the number of people it provides 
case management services to.  
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A CCB’S OPPORTUNITIES TO ACT ON PRIVATE INTERESTS AS A DIRECT SERVICE PROVIDER 
Other CCB Role CCB’s Public Duty as 
Agent of State 
CCB’s Private 
Interest as 
Provider 
Opportunities to Act on 
Private Interests 
Single Entry Point 
? I&R 
? Eligibility 
Determination 
? Managing  Waiting 
List 
? Allow choice of 
provider 
? Ensure equitable 
access. 
? Gain competitive 
advantage 
? Minimize costs 
? Maximize revenue 
? Publicize CCB services, but not 
other service providers to limit 
access to information about other 
service providers? 
? Loosen interpretation of 
eligibility criteria and level of 
care to fill available provider 
slots? 
? Use eligibility criteria to screen 
out high cost users? 
? Move people up on the waiting 
list who match openings in CCB 
provider agencies? 
Case Management 
Agency 
? Service Planning 
? Provider Selection 
? Allow choice of 
provider 
? Ensure equitable 
access 
? Gain competitive 
advantage 
? Minimize costs 
? Maximize revenue 
? Develop service plans that favor 
CCB services? 
? Use service planning or provider 
selection process to steer 
participants toward CCB services 
in order to fill open service slots? 
? Use the provider selection 
process to steer low cost 
participants to CCB services & 
high costs participants to other 
providers?* 
OHCDS ? Allow choice of 
provider 
? Gain competitive 
advantage 
? Maximize revenue 
? Negotiate low rates with other 
providers, while offering 
favorable rates to own provider 
agencies?? 
Quality Assurance 
? Monitoring Services 
 
? Complaints 
 
? Incidents 
? Assure provider/ 
service quality 
? Gain competitive 
advantage 
? Minimize costs 
? Suppress complaints against 
CCB? 
? Suppress incidents connected to 
CCB? 
? Less rigorous monitoring of CCB 
services; resistance to 
interventions? 
? Less rigorous advocacy on behalf 
of participant or family? 
                                                 
? With the introduction of standardized rates, the Department expects the opportunity for conflict here to fade. 
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  The CCB’s Role as Organized Health Care Delivery System 
The CCB role as an Organized Health Care Delivery System (OHCDS) also creates a very 
similar array of private interests, potentially playing out when the CCB performs its other roles.    
For example, when serving as the single point of entry or the case management agency, the CCB 
might have an incentive to steer people to OHCDS providers, to less rigorously monitor the 
quality of OHCDS providers, etc.   To the degree that the CCB is able to steer people to 
particular providers, the CCB can create an inappropriate incentive for providers to participate in 
the OHCDS (in addition to the services and protections that appropriately come with being part 
of the OHCDS). 
 
?  EXISTING SAFEGUARDS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR 
IMPROVEMENT 
In this section, we evaluate whether potential conflicts are adequately addressed through existing 
safeguards, whether safeguards can be enhanced, or whether a change to program design features 
is desirable.  
 
We define “safeguard” to mean: 
A policy, procedure or system that works to deter a CCB from acting contrary to the 
Department’s programmatic goals for quality.   
 
While we understand that CCBs may impose their own safeguards to promote appropriate 
behavior, this section focuses on safeguards that are or could be imposed by the Department.  To 
assess the adequacy of a safeguard, we raise two questions: 
? Does the safeguard adequately address the potential conflict?  Are there barriers to the 
effectiveness of the safeguard? 
 
? Is there a method to assess the effectiveness of the safeguard in eliminating or reducing 
the conflict (e.g., oversight method)? 
 
Changes to program design features may be warranted where no effective safeguards exist, 
where there are substantial barriers to their effectiveness, or where oversight methods are weak 
or unavailable to confirm that the safeguard is working.   
We define “design features” as: 
Roles, responsibilities and organizational structures that either produce or eliminate the 
potential for conflict. 
 
The most obvious and effective safeguard for any conflict is the professional, personal and 
contractual commitment of the CCB to program goals and the pursuit of quality outcomes for 
participants.  While we offer an appraisal of safeguards to eliminate conflicts or mitigate their 
impact, none can succeed without the integrity and commitment of the CCB.  Reports from many 
stakeholders suggest that this safeguard is present and leads to very positive experiences within 
the CCB.  We also heard that the CCB’s multiple and blurred roles can undermine the 
effectiveness of this safeguard or confidence that it is working.   
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In addition, while in the previous section we talked about a number of incentives that can operate 
against quality, we have not itemized those instances that operate to promote quality.  Examples 
cited by the CCBs include the CCB’s interest in assuring quality to avoid liability, or the costs 
connected to a crisis.  We do not attempt to assess the possible impact of these “natural” 
safeguards, but note that they are also likely to play a positive role.   
 
Our analysis below reflects findings from a review of four states that allow the same entity to 
perform case management and service provision (OH, SD, VT and WY).  A full review of their 
practices with respect to waiver functions is presented in APPENDIX B.   
 
The following tables examine the adequacy of current safeguards and oversight methods for 
potential conflicts deriving from the CCB’s interest as a service provider and its other roles (see 
TABLE: A CCB’S OPPORTUNITIES TO ACT ON PRIVATE INTERESTS AS A DIRECT SERVICE 
PROVIDER, page 14).   
 
? POTENTIAL CONFLICT summarizes the nature of the conflict.  Potential conflicts are 
organized according to roles described in the first column of the TABLE on page 14.  
 
? EXISTING SAFEGUARDS identify protections currently in place in Colorado to reduce 
the likelihood of a CCB acting on a conflict or mitigating its impact. 
 
? PROPOSED SAFEGUARD ENHANCEMENTS identify additional safeguards or 
enhancements to existing safeguards proposed by the authors. 
 
? PROPOSED DESIGN FEATURES identify changes to program design proposed by the 
authors. 
 
? DDD OVERSIGHT METHODS describe existing processes and tools used by DDD to 
assess whether a safeguard is working as intended.  Oversight methods listed in italics 
are processes and tools proposed by the authors to supplement existing oversight 
methods.  
 
? BARRIERS TO EFFECTIVENESS identify the authors’ understanding of issues that may 
undermine the adequacy of a given safeguard or oversight method.  
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 Information and Referral (I&R) 
 
POTENTIAL CONFLICT: The CCB is the focal point for participants and families to learn about available 
services and supports in the community in an objective and comprehensive manner.  As a direct provider of 
care, the CCB has the discretion to limit access to information about other service providers or to bias 
information in favor of its own providers. 
Existing Safeguards Oversight Method 
(Italics = proposed) 
Barriers to Effectiveness 
CCB required to provide 
information on all available 
services and supports that may 
be available to persons with 
DD 
? Participant survey to assess 
understanding of available 
resources to support persons 
with DD. 
? CCB might not provide assistance to 
participant in sorting through the 
service provider options. 
? CCBs may withhold information 
about available service providers 
Statewide referral list of 
approved service agencies in 
the CCB’s designated service 
area is posted on the 
Department website.   
? Participant survey to assess 
understanding of available 
resources to support persons 
with DD.  
? Website viewed as not user-friendly, 
insufficient information to inform 
decisions on quality. 
? CCB less knowledgeable about other 
community resources that could 
address needs of clients. 
Proposed  
Safeguard Enhancements 
  
Department protocol defining 
CCB’s handling and 
documentation of I&R 
activities 
? DDD conducts onsite quality 
reviews of CCB 
performance including 
review of I&R activities, on 
more frequent basis. 
? Log of I&R requests and 
actions taken by CCB. 
? Participant survey to assess 
understanding of available 
resources 
? Administrative burden of maintaining 
a log of requests and actions. 
? DDD onsite quality review does not 
focus on role of CCB in I&R. 
? DDD onsite quality review happens 
infrequently. 
 
Prohibit promotion of CCB 
service providers at the 
exclusion of other community 
providers and resources. 
 
? DDD conducts onsite quality 
reviews of CCB 
performance including 
review of promotional 
activities. 
 
? Role in I&R can be confused with 
opportunities to promote CCBs own 
service providers 
? No separation of CCB identity as 
single entry point and service 
provider (e.g., co-located, same 
name) 
Proposed Design Feature: 
? Remove I & R from CCB responsibility in all or some (e.g., urban) CCBs 
 
Current safeguards focus on requirements that the CCB fully inform participants of the array of 
services and resources in the community to serve persons with developmental disabilities and a 
state referral list that standardizes information about available qualified DD providers.  Neither 
of these safeguards sufficiently embrace the CCB’s broader role in promoting service integration 
and awareness among all service providers, including those not specific to the DD population but 
which may affect their lives or wellbeing (e.g., vocational rehab services or housing subsidies).   
 
Two safeguard enhancements could strengthen the role of I & R and engage the CCB beyond its 
more narrow perspective as service provider.  A comprehensive guide or protocol for conducting 
the I&R function, combined with more regular reporting to and review by the Department of 
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 activities, would enhance CCB understanding of its responsibilities to promote and refer to a 
broad community of resources beneficial to participants.  A safeguard prohibiting the CCB from 
promoting its own services at the exclusion of others would help to distinguish its obligations for 
community outreach and awareness building from marketing its own services.  Each of these 
safeguards has barriers to effectiveness.   
 
Removing the I&R function from the CCB eliminates role confusion but also has potential costs 
and consequences. Rural areas, in particular, may lack the infrastructure and knowledgeable staff 
to establish I&R functions outside the CCB structure.   
 
Eligibility Determination 
 
POTENTIAL CONFLICT: The CCB conducts the level of care determination and assesses whether an individual meets the 
target population criteria for the waiver program.  These functions give the CCB discretion to limit equitable access to 
services by screening people out who are hard to serve or giving advantage to others. 
Existing Safeguards Oversight Methods 
(Italics = proposed) 
Barriers to Effectiveness 
CCB is required to use a 
prescribed tool (ULTC-100.2) 
and criteria and to document 
decisions on a web-based 
database maintained by Medicaid. 
? BUS runs internal system error check 
verifying eligibility based on reported 
information 
? DDD Medicaid staff reviews ULTC 
100.2, final Service Plan and IP cover 
sheet for internal consistency 
? DDD conducts onsite quality reviews 
of CCB performance, including review 
of appropriateness of eligibility 
determinations, every 3 years 
? Medicaid conducts periodic review of 
LOC for conformance with state and 
federal assurances 
? Conduct focused study of LOC 
determinations by CCB 
? Variability in interpretation of 
determination criteria by the CCB. 
? Infrequency of DDD onsite quality 
reviews  
 
 
 
Participant has a right to appeal 
CCB decisions to the Department. 
? Participant survey  to assess 
awareness of appeal process  
? Review frequency of appeals on 
LOC/waiver denials  
? Review frequency of appeals upheld 
? Access to advocate to assist during 
appeal process 
? Fear of retaliation 
? Intimidating, formal process 
Proposed  
Safeguard Enhancement 
  
Reduce interpretive variation in 
LOC determinations among 
CCBs through enhanced training  
? Medicaid conducts periodic review of 
LOC for conformance with state and 
federal assurances. 
 
Proposed Design Features: 
? CCB conducts LOC and waiver eligibility review; Department approves determinations. 
? Department conducts and approves LOC and waiver eligibility determinations. 
 
Under existing safeguards, the Department has a standardized instrument and process for 
conducting LOC determinations and a database documenting LOC decisions made by the CCB.  
Federal rules allow entities other than Medicaid to make LOC determinations but the Medicaid 
agency must oversee the performance of the entity, including ensuring that applicable level of 
care criteria have been properly applied.  These provisions require the Department to 
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 independently assess the quality of LOC reviews performed by the CCB.  Currently, onsite 
quality reviews are the only oversight method for validating LOC documentation.   In an 
agreement with DHS, Medicaid requires that a statistically valid sample of participant functional 
assessments be shared with the agency for review.  While these reviews are able to assess the 
completeness and timeliness of LOC determinations, they are unable to assess their validity.  We 
are concerned that the onsite quality review, which includes meeting with participants and 
comparing their functional status with the LOC assessment, is conducted only once every 3 
years.    
Of the states reviewed for this study, all four require the state to make final determinations with 
respect to LOC determination.  The accountability placed on Medicaid for LOC determinations 
suggests to us that more careful study is needed to determine whether this function is being 
appropriately conducted at the CCB level.  Unless onsite quality reviews are conducted on a 
more regular basis, we are concerned that there is insufficient information upon which to show 
ongoing evidence of compliance with CMS assurances.  The optional design feature proposes to 
insert the Department directly in the eligibility determination process, a remedy that while 
solving the problem, has significant cost implications.    
 
Administration of the Waiting List 
 
POTENTIAL CONFLICT: Each CCB is responsible for managing the waiting list within its catchment area.  
This role gives discretion to the CCB to favor individuals in providing more rapid placement or to fill 
openings in its service agency.    
Existing Safeguards Oversight Methods 
(Italics = proposed) 
Barriers to Effectiveness 
 
Persons are selected for 
services from the waiting list 
according to criteria and 
interpretive guidelines 
established by the Department. 
? CCB is required to enter 
waiting list documentation 
into CCMS, a web 
environment designed and 
accessible to DDD 
? DDD conducts onsite 
quality reviews of CCB 
performance, including 
management of waiting list 
? Discretion in how to apply criteria. 
? Infrequency of state onsite quality 
reviews 
 
Proposed 
Safeguard Enhancement 
  
Strengthen guidance on 
decisions related to waiting list 
allocations, especially in cases 
of emergency.   
More timely review by DDD of 
cases where individuals are 
placed on the waiver out of 
sequence with their eligibility 
date. 
 
Proposed Design Options: 
? CCB recommends slot allocations from the waiting list; the Department approves  
? Centralize management of the waiting list. 
 
The central statewide data base on the waiting list provides useful information to DDD on the 
movement of individuals on and off the waiting list by catchment area.  We would suggest that 
this information be more carefully monitored, especially with respect to decisions where 
individuals are taken out of sequence for placement when a waiver opening becomes available. 
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 Two of the states reviewed (SD and WY) maintain the waiting list at the State level and allocate 
available slots centrally.  Two states (OH, VT) delegate responsibility for the waiting list to the 
local entity, requiring routine reporting to the State on its status.   
Strengthening review of outliers is an important safeguard enhancement but, as long as authority 
for allocating slots remains with the CCB, the Department is placed in a reactive role to correct 
inappropriate decisions.  Two design options remove decision-making authority from the CCB, 
thus eliminating the basis of the conflict.  
   
Service Planning 
 
 POTENTIAL CONFLICT: The CCB case manager, together with the participant and interdisciplinary team, 
develops an individualized plan specifying the scope and frequency of services required in response to a 
participant’s needs and preferences.  This role gives the CCB discretion to identify service needs that benefit its 
own service providers or to steer participants into its own services.    
Existing Safeguards DDD Oversight Methods 
(Italics = proposed) 
Barriers to Effectiveness 
 
The Department specifies 
elements that must be addressed 
in the IP and the process and 
timelines for its completion. 
? Select elements from IPs 
entered into state database 
for review 
? DDD conducts onsite quality 
reviews of CCB 
performance, including IP 
development, every 3 years 
? DDD reviews 20% sample 
of IPs on day programs, 
residential and SLS/CES, 
every 3 years 
? Medicaid reviews all initial 
IPs 
? Medicaid reviews IPs for 
consistency with state and 
CMS assurances 
? CCB bias in identifying service needs 
based on its own service provision 
  
 
The CCB is required to convene 
an interdisciplinary team (IDT) 
to facilitate service planning. 
? DDD conducts onsite quality 
reviews of CCB 
performance, including 
composition of ID, 
? Limited check on CCB influence over 
IDT composition 
? Composition can be driven by CCB 
service agency 
Support Intensity Scale (SIS) to 
reduce variations in service 
planning. 
? Medicaid conducts periodic 
review of IPs for 
conformance with state and 
federal assurances 
? Perceived to be subject to gaming and 
variations across CCBs 
Proposed 
Safeguard Enhancements 
  
Enhance training and oversight 
of case manager’s role as 
neutral facilitator of IP. 
? Participant survey to assess 
IP development process.  
? Neutrality of CCB. 
Required composition of IDT to 
include external providers 
? Medicaid conducts periodic 
review of Plan of Care for 
conformance with state and 
federal assurances 
? Can be inconsistent with participant 
choice and control 
 
Optional Design Features: 
? Provide option for independent case manager to develop IP or resource person to attend IP development 
meeting. 
? No longer allow case management agency to provide direct services. 
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The development of an effective IP rests on the ability of a case manager to provide guidance 
grounded solely on the interests of the participant.  This relationship must be built on trust and 
confidence that other considerations do not interfere with decisions relative to what is best for 
the participant within available resources.   
 
The introduction of the SIS and documentation of individualized plans on the BUS enhances 
standardization and review by the Department to assure consistent development of IPs within 
and across CCBs. The Department’s onsite quality reviews offer the best opportunity to validate 
the accuracy and fairness of IPs.  These are conducted at the CCB and service agency levels 
every 3 years.  While this results in a significant overall sample of IPs being reviewed each year 
(estimated to be approximately 800), it does not necessarily mean that IPs are reviewed for each 
CCB on an annual basis.  We understand the resource intensity of conducting onsite reviews and, 
if annual reviews are not possible, we suggest that data available through the BUS and other 
sources be used to assess trends that may suggest inappropriate service planning by CCBs on an 
ongoing basis. 
Revising composition requirements for the IDT to include persons outside the employ of the 
CCB could help neutralize the potential for conflict.  Imposing requirements on IDT 
membership, however, may undermine participant’s voice in the planning process.   
Our four-state review revealed several strategies for addressing this conflict.   Protections in 
these states fall into 3 major categories: 
? Frequent and prescribed assessment by the state of the local service planning process and its 
conformance with guidelines (OH, SD, VT, WY). 
? The establishment of a uniform assessment process that limits discretion and eases periodic 
review for conformance to guidelines (VT) 
? The introduction of an independent party to participate in plan of care meetings (WY) 
We believe that the proposed design feature of introducing an independent party during IP 
development offers a solution for those participants who avail themselves of the resource.  The 
design feature of eliminating case management agencies from delivering direct service restores 
objectivity to the process for all participants. 
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 Provider Selection 
   
POTENTIAL CONFLICT: The CCB case manager is responsible for assuring that participants are fully informed of 
all qualified providers in an area and overseeing the selection of providers with the participant.  The CCB has the 
discretion to steer participants to the agency’s providers or those favored by the agency.   
Existing Safeguards Oversight Methods 
(Italics = proposed) 
Barriers to Effectiveness 
CCBs are required to follow a 
process of developing a 
participant profile and soliciting 
provider interest through a RFP. 
? DDD conducts onsite reviews 
of CCB performance, including 
sample review of participant 
profiles and RFPs to determine 
consistency with policy 
? Written acknowledgement by 
participant of receipt of 
provider information 
? Not all participants or their families 
know to ask to see their profiles to 
assure its accuracy. 
? Transparency of process for soliciting 
provider interest and reviewing 
provider proposals. 
? Infrequency of state onsite quality 
review 
? Steering to CCB services before 
selection process is initiated. 
Referral list provided by the 
Department for approved 
services in a service area. 
? Participant survey to assess 
adequacy and 
comprehensiveness of referral 
list 
? Updates and accuracy of referral list 
? Limited information for assessing 
quality 
? Case manger’s lack of knowledge or 
unwillingness to assist with. sorting 
options 
Proposed  
Safeguard Enhancements 
  
Six month review of provider 
choices with participants. 
? Written acknowledgement by 
participant that case manager 
reviewed service options 
? Administrative burden 
? Potential disruption to service delivery 
More prescriptive standards for 
provider selection process. 
? DDD conducts onsite reviews 
of CCB performance, including 
review of provider selection 
process 
 
Standard profile of provider 
attributes and quality 
performance 
? Participant survey to assess 
usefulness of provider profiles 
? Timely access to accurate and 
consistent data. 
Proposed Design Features: 
? State employs/contracts with independent case managers as an option for participants during provider 
selection process. 
? Centralize provider selection process through a state or independent entity. 
 
Central to the waiver program and federal assurances is a person’s freedom to select among 
qualified providers.  The lack of transparency in the process and a standard means for monitoring 
adherence to the Department protocol undermine trust that the system is working as it should.   
 
The four study states all retain responsibility for facilitating provider choice at the case manager 
level.  Three have safeguards to reduce potential conflict.  Vermont involves the State in 
decisions when the designated agency disagrees with the participant on his or her choice.  
Wyoming requires case managers to review provider choices with the participant every six 
months and to have the participant attest to the discussion.  Ohio is developing a user-friendly 
website on certified providers for use by participants and families to make them more informed 
and engaged in the provider selection process.   
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Current safeguards and enhancements all have significant barriers to their effectiveness.  The 
design feature for participants to work with an independent case manager eliminates the conflict 
for those opting to use it while raising cost and logistical issues that we have not considered.  
This option creates some additional conflicts of interest for the CCB, which may have an 
incentive to limit access to information about this option or refer difficult to serve participants to 
the alternative case management agency.  Eliminating the provider selection process from the 
role of the CCB is a more comprehensive design feature that removes the question of bias for all 
participants, but with obvious cost implications.   
 
Rate Negotiation 
 
POTENTIAL CONFLICT: When acting as an organized health care delivery system (OHCDS), a CCB can set 
rates for services, permitting the CCB to pay its own provider agencies for the same service more than it 
does other providers.   
Existing Safeguards Oversight Methods 
(Italics = proposed) 
Barriers to Effectiveness 
State rules govern purchase 
service rates and allowable fees 
for services provided to 
network providers. 
? DDD conducts onsite reviews 
of CCB performance, 
including review of rate 
determinations. 
? Department review of methods 
for determining rates and fees 
in advance of their adoption 
by the CCB. 
? No opportunity for public comment 
? Different rates within and across 
CCBs may result in variations in 
services and quality.  
 
Dispute resolution process. ? Dispute resolution findings 
reported to Department. 
? Fear of retaliation 
Proposed 
Safeguard Enhancement 
  
More specific guidance on 
allowable withholds for 
administrative fees. 
? DDD conducts onsite reviews 
of CCB performance, 
including review of rate 
determinations 
 
Proposed Design Feature: 
? Separate OHCDS from the CCB. 
 
Existing safeguards leave discretion to the CCB to negotiate service rates with their network 
providers, notwithstanding a State-established rate for each Medicaid service. While we 
understand this to be a business transaction with provider partners that is an acceptable and legal 
practice, it has the potential to lead to inequities in service delivery and therefore should be the 
subject of regular Department oversight.  The dispute resolution process for providers introduces 
independent review of the arrangement and mitigates against unfair practices.  Our review did 
not include an analysis of the federal OHCDS rules to determine the constraints that may be 
imposed on the negotiation.  Nor did we examine how this practice affects Medicaid rules 
requiring that payments for waiver services (like other Medicaid services) be consistent.   
Separating the OHCDS from other CCB roles eliminates this conflict.  An alternative, more fully 
explored in the conclusions, would have the Department separately solicit entities to organize 
one or more OHCDS systems and prohibit service providers from qualifying.   
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 Monitoring Services 
POTENTIAL CONFLICT: The CCB is responsible for monitoring implementation of the individualized plan by 
provider agencies.  This role places discretion within the CCB case manager to enforce a different standard of 
quality among service providers. 
Existing Safeguards Oversight Methods 
(Italics = proposed) 
Barriers to Effectiveness 
State requires each CCB to 
have a written protocol for case 
management monitoring that 
addresses general guidelines 
established by the Department. 
? DDD conducts onsite reviews 
of CCB performance, including 
review of provider monitoring 
activities. 
 
? No prior review and approval of 
monitoring protocol by the 
Department. 
? State guidance does not address 
incentive to favor own providers 
? Lack of transparency in monitoring 
process. 
? Lack of consistency within CCB 
service area. 
? Service providers subject to multiple 
reviews. 
? Limited enforcement authority when 
problems are found. 
CCBs required to develop a 
monitoring tool for use in 
assessing performance of area 
providers. 
? Monitoring tool submitted to 
Department. 
? Findings of CCB monitoring 
submitted to Department and 
other CCBs working with the 
Service Provider 
? Inconsistent monitoring practices 
among CCBs and within their service 
network. 
? Lack of transparency in results of 
monitoring 
? Lack of effective enforcement tools 
when problems are identified. 
Proposed 
Safeguard Enhancements 
  
Standard tool and protocol for 
monitoring IP implementation 
and conducting programmatic 
reviews  
? Periodic findings of case 
management review submitted 
to the Department. 
? Lack of transparency 
? Incentive to favor own providers 
? Lack of consistency across CCBs in 
monitoring practices. 
Proposed Design Features: 
? Include peers or independent case manager when monitoring IP implementation at the CCB’s own service 
providers. 
? No longer allow case management agency to provide direct services. 
 
An essential role of case management is to assure the quality, appropriateness and timeliness of 
services identified in the IP.  This task requires case managers to review the performance of all 
service providers, including the CCB’s own. 
Colorado’s current safeguard results in inconsistency across CCBs and imposes no rigorous 
standard on the role of the case manager when monitoring services delivered by CCB providers.  
The establishment of a standard tool and protocol, combined with submittal of monitoring 
findings to the Department and to other CCBs that may also be working with the service 
provider, could enhance safeguards but does not limit the potential for bias.   
Wyoming’s use of area resource specialists (ARS) is one approach for neutralizing this situation.  
The state-employed ARS periodically attends IP meetings to monitor plan implementation.  The 
Department also conducts random samples of a participant’s services to assess compliance with 
the terms of the plan of care. 
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 One design feature separates direct service from the role of case management, thus eliminating 
the conflict.  Another optional design feature requires the addition of peers or an independent 
case manager whenever a CCB case manager monitors services within his or her own agency.  
We expect this option would be cumbersome to implement and potentially unrealistic given the 
frequency with which this situation arises.   
 
Department rules speak to a programmatic function assumed by the CCB with respect to 
overseeing a provider’s overall performance, unrelated to any one IP.  Although monitoring tools 
are submitted to the Department, there is no formal review and approval process by the 
Department.  Lack of a standardized template for conducting programmatic monitoring and a 
forum for reviewing findings with the Department for possible follow up weakens the impact of 
this programmatic review function and its fairness.    
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 Complaints8 
POTENTIAL CONFLICT: The CCB is responsible for establishing a process through which individuals and 
family members can voice concerns and expect a speedy and fair resolution.  At the same time, the Case 
Manager, employed by the agency also providing service, has potential conflicts in acting as a strong, 
objective advocate.    
Existing Safeguards  Oversight Methods 
(Italics = proposed) 
Barriers to Effectiveness 
Self advocacy or through 
guardians or family members 
? Participant survey to assess 
willingness to complain  
? Not everyone is comfortable or has 
the ability to advocate 
? Reluctance or fear of retaliation 
Professional advocates (e.g., 
ARC, The Legal Center) 
? Participant survey to assess 
how to access professional 
advocates 
? Ability to access advocate when 
needed 
State standards governing the 
CCB’s complaint process. 
? Routine collection of CCB 
complaint logs to assess 
trends and timely resolution 
? Case manger’s ability to act as 
advocate for individual against 
employer 
? CCB’s neutrality in responding to 
complaint. 
CCBs are required to maintain 
and analyze a complaint log to 
determine trends and need for 
system improvement. 
? Routine collection of CCB 
complaint logs to assess 
trends and timely resolution 
? DDD conducts onsite reviews 
of CCB performance, 
including review of complaint 
log and responses  
? Department conducts 
investigations on complaints 
brought to its attention 
? No standard format for tracking 
complaints 
? No standard plain language 
guidance to participants on how to 
voice complaints 
? Reluctance or fear of retaliation to 
make complaint to CCB  
 
Rule/policy protecting 
individuals against retaliation 
? Participant survey to 
assess participant fear 
of retaliation 
? No written process/protocol has 
been implemented 
Proposed 
Safeguard Enhancements 
  
Plain language brochure on 
how to voice complaints 
? Participant survey to assess 
participant understanding of 
complaint process 
 
Case manager training/protocol 
on how to respond to complaint 
and document. 
? Survey of case managers to 
determine their  
? understanding of their role in 
handling complaints. 
? Case manager turnover 
? Requires promotion at all levels of 
the CCB 
? Case manager’s independence from 
the CCB. 
Proposed Design Features: 
? Establish an independent pathway or ombuds program for voicing complaints.  
? Augment existing complaint system with opportunity to complain directly to the Department. 
 
Active complaint systems are considered by many as the hallmark of a good quality management 
program in that (when functioning effectively) they provide a timely means for detecting and 
remedying quality problems.  Existing safeguards provide no uniform check and balance on how 
                                                 
8 Complaint Systems are distinct from the two formal dispute resolution mechanisms available to persons with 
developmental disabilities through the Medicaid Fair Hearing Process or the Dispute Resolution System. 
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 well complaint systems are working within the CCBs or aggregate trends across CCBs.  Nor do 
they offer formal recourse for voicing concerns outside of the CCB.   
 
Ohio requires their County MRDD Boards to submit all complaints to the State for review.  
Wyoming, in addition to complaint systems maintained by local entities, has established a state 
process for receiving complaints directly from participants.   
 
Safeguard enhancements may improve access to the complaint system by building participant 
awareness of the complaint process.   But this improvement does not provide an independent 
agent with authority to investigate problems that may involve the CCB.  The optional design 
feature for establishing an independent pathway for registering and resolving complaints 
removes the fear of retaliation and creates an objective and fair atmosphere for resolving 
problems but may have access barriers.  On the other hand, the development (and promotion) of 
a state-sponsored complaint system offers ready access to persons in authority to act on the 
problem in a fair and neutral manner. 
 
Incident Reporting System 
 
POTENTIAL CONFLICT: The CCB is responsible for establishing policies and procedures for reporting and 
examining incidents and to work to prevent their re-occurrence.  In this role, the CCB has the discretion to 
minimize incidents or otherwise limit follow-up investigations.  
Existing Safeguards  Oversight Methods 
(Italics = proposed) 
Barriers to Effectiveness 
The CCB must establish 
policies to ensure prompt 
notification of specific events 
determined by the State (e.g., 
abuse, neglect, death, serious 
injuries) and others identified 
by the CCB. 
? Complaints entered into web-based 
reporting system (CIRS) maintained 
by the Department including status 
of all follow up activities made by 
the CCB 
? DDD conducts onsite quality 
reviews of CCB performance, 
including reviewing of its incident 
reporting system, every 3 years 
? DDD reviews critical incident 
practices on all service agencies at 
least every 2 years. 
? Lack of transparency to the 
public 
? Sufficient state staff to 
adequately follow up on 
incidents 
 
Each CCB is required to have a 
Human Rights Committee on 
issues of abuse, neglect and 
other serious incidents 
? DDD reviews HRC activities during 
quality onsite reviews (every 3 
years) and during program surveys 
of all service agencies (every 2 
years). 
? Recommendations of HRC submitted 
to Department for review. 
. 
? Membership appointed by 
CCB 
? HRC findings only advisory 
to CCB 
? Information and staff support 
provided by CCB. 
Proposed  
Safeguard Enhancements 
Guidelines, protocol and forms 
for submitting root cause 
analyses via the State’s CIRS. 
? Routine reporting via CIRS of all 
required root cause analyses. 
 
Proposed Design Feature: 
? Critical incidents are reported directly to the Department for analysis, investigation and follow up rather 
than to the CCBs. 
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Effective quality management systems are designed to detect problems quickly, remediate the 
individual situation, and determine whether and how system improvements can be made to avoid 
their reoccurrence.  Critical incident reporting is a major protection within the HCBS system to 
assure quick and proper notification and follow up action for the most serious of events affecting 
participants. 
 
All four states in our study require the immediate reporting of all critical incidents to the State, 
three (OH, SD and VT) via the local entity and one (WY) directly to the State.  Vermont is in the 
process of developing a system that will provide web-based reporting simultaneously to the local 
entity and the State. 
 
Current safeguards have made the Department a more active partner in understanding and 
resolving critical events occurring within the system.  Recent guidance should help to limit 
variations in a CCB’s interpretation of when an event is subject to reporting and the required 
accompanying documentation.  The system should be accompanied by dedicated Department 
personnel to follow up and assure that comprehensive and accurate assessments of the problem 
have been made and that systemic changes have been instituted to avoid their reoccurrence in the 
future.  Unclear in the current guidance is the extent to which the CCB and Department will 
work collaboratively to investigate problems.  The web-based system does not resolve this 
question and, without further directives, may lead to confusion on who is in charge of 
determining when adequate remedies have been put into place.  
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 Structural Safeguards 
The Department also has adopted several overarching safeguards designed to reduce the potential 
for conflict.  
Structural Safeguards Oversight Methods 
(Italics = proposed) 
Barriers to Effectiveness 
CCB Governing Board 
membership    
? Review of CCB Bylaws to 
determine method of selection 
 
? No required public process for 
selection of board. 
? Independence of Board members 
from influence of CCB Executive 
Director 
? Independence of CCB Executive 
Director from influence of Board 
members 
Rules requiring separation of 
case management from service 
provision. 
? DDD conducts onsite quality 
reviews of CCB performance, 
including review of I&R 
activities, on more frequent 
basis. 
? Log of I&R requests and 
actions taken by CCB. 
? Participant survey to assess 
understanding of available 
resources 
? CCB and service providers have 
same name and location 
? Public perception does not 
recognize organizational 
distinctions 
 
Annual designation of CCB 
 
? Findings of designation 
process. 
? Opportunity for public input into 
designation process 
Two-way Agreement between 
DDD and CCB specifies 
conflict of interest standards 
? CCB required to submit to 
Department written code of 
standards 
? CCB required to submit to 
Department disclosure 
statement  
? Variability across CCB on how 
standards are implemented 
? Does not address multiple roles 
served by CCB and potential for 
conflict. 
Proposed 
Safeguard Enhancement 
 ? Enhance transparency of 
designation process and 
operations of CCB. 
 
 
Current structural standards all have barriers to their effectiveness and offer minimal guidance on 
the fundamental question of conflict as it plays out in the daily operation of the CCB.   Despite 
the presence of these structural safeguards, potential conflicts continue to exist.  Underlying our 
analysis of structural standards is the question of transparency and the process used to engage the 
broader community in decisions with respect to the organization and operations of a CCB.  Each 
of the above safeguard enhancements also could include an opportunity for public disclosure 
and/or input.  In our CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS we examine in detail proposed 
design features to alter the current structure. 
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? CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
We conclude this report with a synthesis of our findings that can serve as a framework for the 
Department as it moves forward.  We identify a series of strategies for addressing the conflicts of 
interest inherent to the existing delivery system, with varying degrees of effectiveness: 
 
? The first set of strategies are the least disruptive to the existing delivery system but are 
also the least likely to effectively safeguard against conflicts of interest.  This set of 
recommendations assumes the CCB continues to play the same roles it does currently but 
would minimize the opportunity for acting on a conflict of interest by imposing standards 
for requiring greater consistency and accountability.    
 
? The second set of strategies considers a range of design options, separating out some of 
the roles currently fulfilled by the CCB.  In all of these options, at a minimum, the direct 
service role is separated from the case management and single entry point role.  These 
design options impose different levels of disruption on the system but are also the most 
likely to be effective at minimizing the potential for a conflict of interest.   
 
? The third set of strategies are not directly related to the multiple roles played by the CCB 
but have a significant impact on the quality of services.  These issues were surfaced in 
our discussion with stakeholders and information we gathered from other states.  We 
include them here because of their potential benefit to the Department.    
 
Moving forward with any of these strategies must involve careful consideration of the costs and 
consequences relative to the expected benefit.  We heard the same theme from many families: 
“Do not fix a problem for someone else by creating problems for me.  Do not add an extra 
administrative cost that means less money for services.  If it’s not broke, don’t fix it!”  For 
example, equitable access to services suggests greater standardization in the eligibility and 
budgeting process.  Greater standardization, however, can (but does not always) mean less 
flexibility to individualized services. 
 
While the Department may be reluctant to disrupt what is working well, it may find compelling 
reasons to do so.  We suggest a balancing test, where any remedy for a conflict is weighed 
against its cost and disruption to the system.  If the scope and severity of a problem is minor, 
ideally the cost and consequence of the remedy should be minor.  However, if the problem has a 
significant negative impact on quality, the cost of the remedy will have more justification.  
Weighing the costs and benefits of the status quo against a proposed remedy involves a range of 
competing priorities.  The Department also needs to balance local control (familiarity and 
responsiveness to the local community) and state level interests in equity, minimizing 
inconsistent and duplicative burden on participants and providers; and compliance with state and 
federal law.   
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 Deciding what weight to give competing priorities is a judgment call,9 ideally based on 
information and stakeholder input.  We do not have all of the information (e.g., impact on cost) 
or stakeholder input that are needed to draw definitive conclusions.  
 
Incremental Strategies to Reduce Conflict or Strengthen State Oversight 
In our identification of incremental strategies, we focused on aspects of the program that did not 
require statutory changes, major expenditures or significant implementation time but which 
could strengthen program quality and oversight to safeguard against conflicts of interest. 10  
These strategies were identified with the pending waiver renewals in mind as an opportunity to 
move forward in the near term.  
 
Develop Comprehensive Operational Protocols for Waiver Programs  
The multiple roles served by the CCB and related opportunities for conflict heighten the need for 
the Department to be particularly clear about its expectations.  The current system allows 
significant discretion by the CCB to conduct its business contrary to the goals of the program.  
We believe that the Department cannot preserve the current structure without being more 
prescriptive about program operations and expectations.   
A major task for DDD and Medicaid staff is to thoroughly document current waiver policies and 
practices in a format that is easily accessible to program managers, CCBs, provider agencies and 
program participants.  Clear and unambiguous language should be used to identify the 
operational protocol for CCBs, including required processes, tools and documentation, in the 
implementation of waiver policy. Experience in other states indicates that the preparation of a 
waiver renewal application is a good opportunity to conduct this exercise and to involve 
stakeholders in its review. 
In earlier sections of this report, we identified safeguard enhancements, many of which could be 
addressed through an Operational Protocol. Some of these may be more easily implemented than 
others.  While we do not have adequate information for assessing the viability of implementing 
the following enhancements in the short term, they are listed below for the Department’s 
consideration: 
? Handling and documentation of requests for information and referral 
? Guidelines for preventing the CCB from promoting its own service agency at the 
exclusion of others  
? Criteria for administration of the waiting list 
? Composition and documentation of an inter-disciplinary team (IDT) 
? Methods and tools for use by case managers in monitoring implementation of 
individualized plans 
                                                 
9 At least where there is discretion.  Compliance with federal or state law, for example, would have greater weight 
than the cost and availability of services. 
10 This report assessed the design and operation of Colorado’s waiver programs for persons with disabilities at a 
point in time.  Our description of the waiver program came largely from rules, policies and documents gathered 
during our study period.  We understand from the Department that substantial changes were made subsequent to our 
study period.  Consequently, some of the strategies proposed in this section may already have been proposed or 
implemented.   
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 ? Review and approval of monitoring tools for CCB oversight of service providers within 
OHCDS 
? Policy or guidance on retaliation11  
? Investigation and analysis of critical incidents by the CCB 
? Protocol for provider referral and selection process 
 
Document Oversight Methods and Quality Indicators used by the Department to assess CCB 
Performance 
The potential for conflict due to the multiple roles of the CCB creates the need for greater 
accountability to assure that standards for quality are met.  It is not sufficient to establish 
standards in an Operational Protocol; the Department must design and implement methods for 
assessing CCB performance against the standards on an ongoing basis.  Under the present 
system, state oversight is the mechanism for restoring confidence that the program is working as 
intended and that consistent standards for monitoring and improving performance are applied 
across the State.   
Our conversations with CMS underscored the importance of documenting in detail how the State 
routinely detects and addresses problems.  Ohio in particular was identified as having 
documented its discovery methods and data sources for each major waiver function and 
assurance.  We concur with CMS on the importance of aligning oversight tools, methods and 
measures with CCB functions, including quality indicators, responsible entity and frequency of 
oversight.  This seems especially relevant given the substantial changes that have and are 
occurring within the Department with respect to its oversight methods and the pending waiver 
renewals.     
Listed below are oversight methods identified in previous sections that were proposed for 
development or improvement: 
? State-sponsored participant survey to assess experience under the waiver program (see 
previous section for specific areas identified for inclusion) 
? State-sponsored survey of case managers to assess their experience in providing case 
management services under the waiver 
? Documentation and reporting of information and referral requests and actions 
? Documentation and reporting of waiting list decisions and rationale 
? Written acknowledgement by participant that the case manager has reviewed all service 
options 
? Written acknowledgement of provider referral and selection process 
? Submittal and review of recommendations of the Human Rights Committee 
? Focused review of level of care determinations 
? Standard tool for monitoring IP implementation 
 
Enhance the Visibility and Leadership Role of Medicaid and DDD 
The discretion of the CCB to act in ways that place private interests over public interests 
undermines the integrity of the program and its accountability to the Department. A perception 
                                                 
11 The Department cites a technical assistance paper, Handling Consumer Complaints:  Pushing the Service Quality 
Envelope, Growing Quality Services (March 2001), as guidance on identifying and preventing retaliation.  This 
document provides a thoughtful analysis of retaliation and suggested strategies for responding to complaints.  
However, as technical assistance rather than policy, we do not view this document as regulating CCB behavior.     
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 held by many stakeholders is that CCBs are the arbiters of how waiver policy is implemented, as 
illustrated by variations across CCBs in how core processes are conducted (e.g., selection of 
qualified providers to meet a participant’s needs).   
We encourage the Department to exert its authority and oversight of the waiver programs in 
more tangible and visible ways so that variations in practice are minimized and accountability is 
centralized.  The development of Operational Protocols and oversight methods are steps in this 
direction.  In addition, the Department could sponsor training programs or communicate directly 
with providers and consumers on issues of statewide concern.  Areas identified in our study 
include:   
? Training to enhance consistent interpretation of criteria for determining Level of Care  
? Training on the development of individualized plans and provider selection process 
? Training on handling and documenting complaints 
? Plain language brochure for consumers on how to voice concerns and make complaints 
 
Move Towards a More Transparent System 
Lack of transparency in how the system works and performs may be contributing to frustrations 
expressed by providers and parents.  We believe that Operational Protocols and documentation 
of oversight methods and processes will be an initial step in reducing ambiguities in people’s 
perceptions of how the program is intended to work.  Disclosure of audit findings and 
performance assessments may be another opportunity to inform stakeholders of the Department’s 
commitment to a fair and comprehensive quality oversight system and to engage them in the 
design of improvement initiatives. 
 
Options for System Re-design  
We do not anticipate that the safeguards identified in the previous section will eliminate the 
opportunity for conflict, given the many roles of the CCB.  Most of the safeguards we identified 
monitor, but do not prevent, the exercise of a conflict of interest.  The compounded effect of the 
CCB’s multiple roles is still likely to confuse participants, families, and even the CCBs, on 
which hat the CCB is wearing at any given point in time (especially when the CCB is co-located 
and shares a name with its provider agencies).  In addition, the ability of participants, families 
and providers to challenge a CCB – an important check on the CCB’s ability to act on a conflict 
– is inhibited when so much control rests in the hands of the CCB.  In this section we present 
three design options aimed at eliminating, reducing or mitigating the potential for conflict by 
reducing the number of roles the CCB plays.  At a minimum, all of these options separate direct 
service from other roles currently performed by the CCB.12  Under each option, we examine 
potential costs and barriers as well as potential benefits. 
     
                                                 
12  Some have suggested that pursuing a less intrusive design option, in which the Department would contract with 
an independent case management agency, other than a CCB, to serve those people who would like an alternative to 
the CCB in their service area.  This option appears to invite some of the same opportunities for conflict of interest 
that already exist:  As the single entry point to services, the CCB is likely to have the same incentive to limit access 
to information about a competing case management agency.  Alternatively, it is has the same incentive to refer 
difficult to serve participants to its competition.   
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 Option 1: Direct Service Separated from Other Roles 
The role that most compromises the ability of the CCB to be seen and to act as a neutral agent in 
the performance of its functions under the waiver program is the provision of direct services.  
Option 1 would separate direct service provision from other functions performed by the CCB.  
All service provision would occur through an organized health care delivery system and/or direct 
contracts with providers.  The organizational entity serving as the CCB would maintain its 
current role as the single entry point and case management provider, or opt to provide direct 
services, but not both.   
 
Option 1 
 
 
 
 
Description: Maintains status quo but removes direct service provision from the CCB.  CCB contracts 
with individual providers and/or establishes organized health care delivery system for direct service 
provision.   
 
Potential Costs and Barriers 
? Viability of providing a full range of direct services outside the infrastructure of the CCB, especially 
in rural areas. 
? Viability of providing single point of entry and case management services at the CCB without service 
provision revenue. 
? Disruption in service provision; confusion among participants during transition 
 
Potential Benefits 
? Eliminates conflicts resulting from CCB’s role as SPOE/direct service provider and case 
manager/direct service provider. 
? Maintains CCB role in assuring adequacy of provider network to meet participant needs within a local 
area.  
? Strengthens the focus of the CCB in serving as SPOE and case manager 
CCB 
Provider 
Contracts 
CM 
DDD 
SPOE Referral 
Referral
Individual 
Providers 
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 Option 2:  Provider Contracts (OHCDS) and Direct Service Separated From Other Roles  
The second option for redesign de-couples the CCB from all provider contracts and limits its role 
to referral for service delivery.  Under this option, the Department would enter into direct 
contractual relationships with one or more organized health care delivery systems to provide 
direct services under its waiver programs.  The organizational entity serving as the CCB would 
maintain its current role as the single entry point and case management provider, or opt to serve 
as the OHCDS/direct service provider, but not both.   
  
 
Option 2 
   
 
Description: Removes CCB from contracting for direct service provision.  The Department 
separately enters into contracts with one or more organized health care delivery system to 
provide services under the waiver.   
 
Potential Costs and Barriers 
? Viability of providing single point of entry and case management services at the CCB 
without service provision revenue. 
? Disruption in service provision; confusion among participants during transition 
 
Potential Benefits 
? Administrative cost savings through consolidation of OHCDS function.  
? Greater opportunity for standardization in quality oversight of service providers. 
? Strengthens independence of CCB role in overseeing implementation of service plan.  
? Strengthens the focus of the CCB in serving as SPOE and case manager. 
CCB 
SPOE CM 
Referral
OHCDS 
Referral 
Individual 
Providers 
DDD 
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 Option 3: All Roles Separate 
Options 1 and 2 alter the role of the CCB but guarantee an ongoing role of the CCB in programs 
providing home and community based services to persons with developmental disabilities.  
Option 3 makes no such assumption, leaving the delivery of SPOE, case management and 
service provision to a competitive bidding process.  The Department would establish qualifying 
criteria. 
 
 
Option 3 
 
CM OHCDS 
Individual 
Providers 
Referral
Referral ReferralSPOE 
DDD 
 
   
Description: Department competitively bids for SPOE, case management and OHCDS functions.  
Department determines qualifying criteria and number of entities for each function.   
  
Potential Costs and Barriers 
? Viability of providing single point of entry and case management services without service 
provision revenue. 
? Disruption in service provision; confusion among participants during transition 
? Lack of local control. 
 
Potential Benefits 
? Removes conflicts inherent to multiple roles served by CCB 
? Administrative cost savings through consolidation of functions.  
? Greater opportunity for standardization in quality oversight of service providers. 
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 Issues outside the Scope of the Study 
In our conversations with stakeholders we identified a series of other issues that may contribute 
to tensions connected to the CCBs’role.  While these issues are not directly related to a conflict 
of interest, we highlight them here for consideration by the Department as it looks to strengthen 
the system of services for persons with developmental disabilities.  
? The lack of a consumer-directed model that enhances consumer choice and control over 
services exacerbates frustration with the CCBs.  Greater consumer choice and control can 
itself be a safeguard.  We understand that the Department’s efforts to introduce greater 
choice and control were delayed by state legislation.  We encourage the Department to 
move forward with its plans.  
? We heard from a number of stakeholders frustrated by the control their CCB exerts over 
local service options and their lack of influence and voice.  We encourage the 
Department to revisit the statutory and regulatory requirement that the CCB develop a 
long-range plan for the development and coordination of services and supports.  The plan 
is to be developed “through collaborative community efforts.”  Few of the stakeholders 
we asked were familiar with this plan or the required annual public forums for updating 
the plan.  The planning process may be a missed opportunity for engaging in public 
dialogue regarding new directions for the service system.  Defining expectations for the 
components of the plan and updates, as well as the “collaborative community efforts” and 
the required annual public forum could provide an opportunity for great public voice in 
delivery system design, providing a chance for participants and families to shape services 
that are more responsive to the needs and preferences of the people served. 
? We heard several comments on the quality of case management services that suggest 
opportunities for improvement.  For example, one parent mentioned that information and 
referral should include more “generic,” or not DD, supports (e.g., the YMCA) that 
promote inclusion and integration. Others expressed their concern that, while a CCB is 
required to provide information and referral to all services and supports, some case 
managers only refer people to those funded through DDD.  People on waiting lists must 
find their own way to housing supports (e.g., Section 8) and vocational rehabilitation 
services.  As the Department establishes its operational protocol, it may wish to consider 
greater specificity in the definition of the case management function.   
? Mil-levy funding was raised in our stakeholder meetings as a major support for 
enhancing services to a community’s population with developmental disabilities and was 
viewed by others as creating service disparities across the State given that not all CCBs 
have access to this funding.  Some questioned whether mil-levies were being used to 
subsidize a CCB’s own service providers rather than support all persons in the 
community with developmental disabilities as required by legislation.   
? Stakeholders expressed concern that the Adult Protective Service system is inadequate to 
meet the need of the population, causing them to defer to the CCB for investigations.   
CCBs confirmed that they were having to step in where APS lacked the resources to 
adequately respond to problems.   
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Appendix A 
 
?  Reference Documents 
 
 
Colorado Statutes, Title 27, Article 10.5. 
  
Developmental Disabilities Services Rule 16. 
 
Health Care Policy and Financing Medical Assistance Staff Manual, §§8.400–401; 
§§8.402-8.416; §8.500, §8.760 
 
Interagency Agreement between Department of Health Care Policy and Financing and 
the Department of Human Services (July 1, 2006). 
  
3-Way Contract Template between Department of Health Care Policy and Financing; the 
Department of Human Services, Division of Developmental Disabilities, and Community 
Centered Boards (contract period of July1, 2007 to June 30, 2008). 
 
Program Quality Standards for On Site Surveys:  CCB Administration and Case 
Management Services, with Interpretive Guidelines. Division of Developmental 
Disabilities, Office of Adult, Disability and Rehabilitation Services, Colorado 
Department of Human Services (Revised December 2001). 
 
DDD Complaint Policy. 
 
DDD Guidelines:  Management of Waiting Lists (Revised January 1995). 
 
DDD Policy:  Conducting an Effective Evidentiary Meeting as Part of the Developmental 
Disabilities System’s Dispute Resolution Process (September 2000). 
 
Directive Memorandum to CCB Directors re service denial policies, DDD (March 27, 
2001).   
 
Directive Memorandum to CCB Directors re revised statewide program approval process 
(March 26, 2007). 
 
Advisory Memorandum to CCB Directors, DDD re critical incident reporting system 
(December 4, 2006)   
 
Letter to Cindi Stetson, Office of the State Auditor, State of Colorado from Fred L. 
DeCresentis, Director, Division of Developmental Disabilities (February 15, 2007). 
  
Letter from Fred DiCrescentis, Director, Division of Developmental Disabilities to 
Barbara Prehmus, Director, Medical Assistance Office, Department of Health Care 
Policy & Finance (April 23, 2007). 
 
Letter from Barbara Prehmus, Director, Medical Assistance Office, Department of Health 
Care Policy & Finance, to Diana Friedli, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
(March 21, 2007). 
 
Handling Consumer Complaints:  Pushing the Service Quality Envelope, Growing 
Quality Services,  Division of Developmental Disabilities, Office of Adult, Disability and 
Rehabilitation Services, Colorado Department of Human Services (March 2001) 
 
Strategic Plan: 2003-2008 for the Colorado Developmental Disabilities Service System  
Division of Developmental Disabilities, Office of Adult, Disability and Rehabilitation 
Services, Colorado Department of Human Services (July 1, 2003). 
 
Special Report to the Joint Budget Committee on the History of Community Centered 
Boards and the History of the Controversy Surrounding Separation of Case Management 
(or Managed Care Duties) From Direct Service Provision, Developmental Disabilities 
Services, Office of Health and Rehabilitation Services, Colorado Department of Human 
Services (January 18, 1996). 
 
Report from Legislative Audit Committee (1987) 
 
Memorandum from Colorado Legislative Council Staff to Interim Committee on Long-
term Care Services and Supports for Persons with Developmental Disabilities. (August 
29, 2007). 
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Appendix B 
Review of Select State Practices Pertaining to Potential Conflicts 
 
Ohio 
Individual Options Waiver 
South Dakota 
Comprehensive DD Waiver 
Vermont 
Waiver for Persons with DD 
Wyoming 
Adult DD Waiver 
Program Overview 
88 County Boards are the primary 
agents of the MRDD waiver’s 
administration. County MRDD 
Boards provide intake and referral, 
case management, program 
planning, some direct services, and 
monitoring of plan implementation 
within the county.  Persons applying 
for the waiver must select a Support 
Services Administrator (SSA) 
employed by the County Board.  
The SD Division of Developmental 
Disabilities certifies 19 non-profit 
Adjustment Training Centers (ATC) 
to provide case management and, at 
a minimum, day habilitation services 
to persons with mental retardation or 
developmental disabilities within a 
defined geographic area.  ATCs are 
required to be re-certified by the 
State no less often than every 2 
years.   
Each consumer must have a 
designated service coordinator 
responsible for monitoring the 
implementation of a service plan.  If 
the service coordinator is 
responsible for any direct 
implementation of the consumer’s 
plan, another service coordinator or 
staff member, designated by the 
ATC, shall conduct quarterly 
observations of those services. 
A pilot project is underway to 
develop an independent case 
management option external to the 
provider network.   
10 Designated Agencies (DA) are 
responsible for ensuring needed 
services are available for persons 
with developmental disabilities in 
Vermont.  The DA is responsible for 
local planning, service coordination 
and monitoring outcomes of the 
region they serve.  DAs must 
provide services directly or contract 
with other providers to deliver 
supports and services.  DA is 
responsible for intake and referral, 
assessing individual needs and 
assignment funding, developing 
support plan, providing regional 
crisis response services, and 
providing or arranging for 
comprehensive service network 
within its region.   
In addition 5 Specialized Service 
Agencies (SSA) have been 
designated to provide distinctive, 
specialized services.   
Re-designation of DA and SSA is 
conducted every 4 years by the State 
The WY Developmental Disabilities 
Division purchases services for 
persons with developmental 
disabilities from programs that 
provide case management, direct 
service or both.  A core group of 
programs are accredited by the 
Commission on Accreditation of 
Rehabilitation Facilities (CARF) and 
provide both case management and 
direct services.  
Area Resource Specialists (ARS) 
work for the State to provide initial 
assistance to consumers in accessing 
waivers; assure freedom of choice in 
selecting a case manager from list 
provided by the State; attend plan of 
care meetings, and be the contact on 
local level to address concerns. 
 
  
Ohio 
Individual Options Waiver 
South Dakota 
Comprehensive DD Waiver 
Vermont 
Waiver for Persons with DD 
Wyoming 
Adult DD Waiver 
Level of Care (LOC) Determination 
County MRDD Bds complete initial 
assessment packet for waiver 
enrollment.  Eligibility Unit in 
Medicaid reviews assessments and 
recommends formal LOC 
determination. 
Using standardized ICAP form, 
ATC submits data for LOC 
determination for State approval.  
ICAP is part of the information used 
by State to also determine rate 
within which service plan is 
developed. 
LOC review conducted by DA and 
approved by State. 
The Case Manager schedules the 
ICAP screen which is conducted by 
state contractor and assembles 
information for LOC and waiver 
eligibility determination.  Information 
is submitted to State for review and 
approval. 
Service Planning, Funding and Monitoring 
The SSA is responsible for 
completing the OH Developmental 
Disabilities Tool (ODDP) that 
generates a standardized score based 
on service needs.  The ODDP links 
the assessment to a funding range 
that allows individuals with similar 
needs to access comparable waiver 
services throughout the State. An 
Individual Service Plan is developed 
by the SSA, with no prescribed tool 
required. The ISP process identifies 
the actual services needed by the 
individual, and develops a funding 
level based on the funding range.  
The SSA monitors implementation 
of the service plan. 
ATC case manager develops and 
approves plans of care within 
funding levels established by the 
State. No prescribed service plan 
tool required although policies on its 
content established. 
Service planning and funding level 
determined by DA using a standard 
assessment tool.  DA responsible for 
monitoring service plan 
implementation. Funding levels 
>$100,000 approved by State. 
Case manager is responsible for the 
development of the plan of care, 
subject to State approval, and ongoing 
monitoring of plan implementation.   
Funding levels determined by State. A 
State Extraordinary Care Committee 
can authorize funding for emergency 
requests. 
ARS periodically attends plan of care 
meetings to monitor plan 
implementation process.   
Survey/Certification staff review 
random sample of participants’ 
services to assess implementation of 
plans of care.   
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Ohio 
Individual Options Waiver 
South Dakota 
Comprehensive DD Waiver 
Vermont 
Waiver for Persons with DD 
Wyoming 
Adult DD Waiver 
Freedom of Choice of Providers 
State rules require individuals to 
have access to contact information 
about all certified provides; website 
being modified to include user-
friendly provider info for consumers 
and families. 
State conducts quarterly reviews of 
sample service plans to confirm that 
individuals are afforded choice of 
providers and case manager conform 
to state requirements associated with 
consumer choice of provider. 
Providers are required to provide 
consumer with a list of available 
providers of interest to the consumer 
whether at host ATC or other 
provider. 
The DA must help consumers learn 
about service options, including all 
providers in the region that can 
respond to their needs.  The 
recipient may choose to receive 
services from any certified provider.  
If the DA disagrees with the choice, 
the consumer is notified and the 
Director of the State DD Division 
reviews the issue and makes a final 
decision. 
 
Case manager provides consumer 
with current service provider list.  The 
consumer signs a “Notice of Choice” 
document to confirm that he/she has 
been informed of choices available. 
 
Case manager required to review 
provider options with individual and 
confirm preferred choice every 6 mos. 
Governance of Sub-State Entity 
Composition of County MRDD 
Boards determined by the county. 
Each ATC must adopt bylaws that 
provide for a rotating board of 
directors; establish term limits not to 
exceed 3 years and no more than 3 
consecutive terms; provide 
opportunity for consumers and 
family members to be on the board; 
provide that members of the board 
serve without pay; and provide that 
no financial benefit accrue as a 
result of membership on the board. 
Majority of Board members are 
comprised of consumers and family 
members.  Composition of the 
Board is confirmed by 
organization’s independent audit. 
Local Program Standing Committee 
(a minimum of 5 members, majority 
of which are consumers and family 
members – and 25% must be 
consumers) reports to the Board and 
is responsible for: hiring key 
management of DA, quality 
assessment, and development of 
local system of care plan. 
No requirements for required 
composition 
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Ohio 
Individual Options Waiver 
South Dakota 
Comprehensive DD Waiver 
Vermont 
Waiver for Persons with DD 
Wyoming 
Adult DD Waiver 
Quality Management and Improvement 
The State is moving toward a data-
driven quality management system 
with participation by local agents 
and consumers. 
A State Quality Management 
Advisory Council (QMAC) guides 
the development and 
implementation of a Quality 
Management system for the MRDD 
waivers. Using data reported by 
County MRDD Bds, 
recommendations for system 
changes will be made. 
The QMAC will help design data 
reporting requirements for County 
MRDD Bds that may in the future 
be reported publicly. 
ATC must apply a Life Quality 
Review process for maximizing an 
individual’s outcomes in the areas of 
choice, relationships, lifestyle, 
health and well being, rights and 
satisfaction. 
 
All service providers are required to 
have internal Quality Management 
Plans approved by State and 
demonstrated data information 
systems to properly assess and 
report performance. DAs and SSAs 
are reviewed every 2 years. 
No specific provider level quality 
management program required. 
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Ohio 
Individual Options Waiver 
South Dakota 
Comprehensive DD Waiver 
Vermont 
Waiver for Persons with DD 
Wyoming 
Adult DD Waiver 
Critical Incident Reporting 
Incidents are reported to the County 
MRDD Bd which reports the 
information to the State. County 
MRDD Boards are responsible for 
immediate action, investigations, 
and prevention planning for each 
incident. 
The State Major Unusual Incident 
and Registry Unit reviews all 
critical incidents. The State 
provides TA to providers and 
counties and conducts annual 
assessment of each County MRDD 
Board’s incident response system.  
The ATC must submit an incident 
report to the State within 48 hours or 
the next working day whichever 
occurs first of becoming aware of the 
incident.  The Division of 
Developmental Disabilities conducts 
investigations and sometimes 
receives assistance from the 
protection and advocacy agency. A 
report on aggregate incident data is 
published annually by the State. 
Critical incidents received over past 
2 yrs are examined prior to Quality 
Service Review to identify trends 
and areas for improvement. 
Web-based reporting system under 
development. 
 
Critical incidents are reported to 
State via electronic incident 
reporting system.  Regional 
Survey/Certification Unit 
required to review and conduct 
incident investigations as needed.  
 
Complaints and Grievances 
The County MRDD Bd must have a 
complaint resolution process that 
includes the submittal of complaints 
to the Director of the State Office of 
MRDD.   
 
The Medicaid office administers the 
state hearing process and analyzes 
requests for hearings to identify the 
frequency and types of requests. 
Each provider is required to inform 
each participant at their annual 
meeting that if they have any 
questions, they can contact the 
division. 
 
The ATC must have a grievance 
process approved by State that allows 
an individual to appeal any decision 
or action by the ATC that affects the 
individual.  Aggregate data regarding 
grievances is not collected at this 
time. 
Plain language brochures on How to 
File a Complaint and How to Appeal 
A Decision are broadly 
disseminated. [Note: these brochures 
are currently being revised in 
accordance with new regulations.] 
Grievance policy addresses issues of 
confidentiality, retaliation, and 
mediation. 
Grievance data received over past 2 
yrs is examined prior to agency 
Quality Services Review. 
Providers required to have 
complaint process with 
timeframes for response.  In 
addition, the State has its own 
process for receiving complaints 
directly and maintains data base 
for tracking resolution.   
Providers are not required to 
submit complaint log to State.  
State reviews provider complaint 
process during onsite reviews. 
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Ohio 
Individual Options Waiver 
South Dakota 
Comprehensive DD Waiver 
Vermont 
Waiver for Persons with DD 
Wyoming 
Adult DD Waiver 
Oversight of Entity 
The State conducts comprehensive 
field reviews of each waiver at least 
as often as the waiver comes up for 
federal renewal.   Based on face-to-
face interviews and record reviews for 
samples of about 400 consumers, the 
State assesses performance and 
compliance in regard to all federal 
waiver requirements, issues reports, 
and requests corrective actions if 
needed. 
Quarterly reviews of a sample of 
service plans to assess adequacy, 
completeness and appropriate 
implementation. 
The State monitors and accredits 
County MRDD Boards; accreditation 
is given for period of from 1 to 5 
years.  The State also certifies and 
registers county board employees; 
certifies HCBS providers; and 
licenses residential facilities.   
 
The State delegates responsibility for 
some provider compliance monitoring 
to county  MRDD Bds; however, if 
the county board identifies any 
concerns during monitoring activities, 
the State is notified, reviews the 
concerns, and issues any findings or 
citations that are warranted. 
Biennial reviews conducted by 
State to assess conformance of 
ATC with state requirements.  
Biennial surveys also include a 
medical and programmatic review 
for 5% of enrolled individuals.   
State team (including at least 1 
consumer) conducts Quality 
Services Review of DA every 2 
years thru consumer interviews, 
record reviews, observation and 
discussions with agency staff.  DA 
required to submit Quality Action 
Plan according to state-defined 
template. 
 
State Survey/Certification Unit is 
responsible for completing initial 
certification of new providers and 
annual recertification of waiver 
providers.   
In addition, agencies are subject to 
CARF review every 1-3 years based 
on findings.  Findings of CARF 
review submitted to the State for 
follow up on issues pertaining to 
health, safety and individual rights. 
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Ohio 
Individual Options Waiver 
South Dakota 
Comprehensive DD Waiver 
Vermont 
Waiver for Persons with DD 
Wyoming 
Adult DD Waiver 
Quality Improvement Plans 
County MRDD Bds must submit a 
corrective action plan in response to 
issues identified in the accreditation 
review.  Service providers are 
required to submit corrective action 
plans as a result of issues identified 
in the State’s compliance review. 
 
 
The State requires the ATC to have 
a Quality Life Review conducted by 
the State or the Council on Quality 
and Leadership.  The review focuses 
on a sample (2/3 selected by State; 
1/3 selected by ATC) of individuals 
to determine presence of desired 
outcomes.  At least 17 of the total 25 
outcomes must be met for re-
certification.  All 19 providers are 
accredited by CQL. The ATC must 
submit a Plan of Enhancement to 
State specifying actions to findings 
of biennial review and Life Quality 
Review. 
 
State staff assists service providers 
in development and implementation 
of Quality Action Plans resulting 
from Quality Services Review.   
TA also given to help providers and 
consumers (who self direct) develop 
internal quality management 
strategies.   
A quality improvement plan is 
required for each recommendation 
made during a provider certification 
including action steps, responsible 
parties, and dates of completion for 
each recommendation  
Surveyor/Certification staff are 
responsible for review and tracking of 
QIPs. .   
Public Reporting 
The State is coordinating the 
development of an interagency set of 
waiver performance measures which 
will become a basis to examine 
performance across waivers and 
over time, to identify and replicate 
best practices, etc. 
The State publishes an annual report 
showing aggregate findings of the 
performance of its waiver programs.  
 Agency-specific results of CARF and 
State reviews published on the 
website.  
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Ohio 
Individual Options Waiver 
South Dakota 
Comprehensive DD Waiver 
Vermont 
Waiver for Persons with DD 
Wyoming 
Adult DD Waiver 
Waiting Lists 
Waiting lists are managed at the 
county level.  Counties 
are responsible for inputting waiting 
list data into a State database. 
 
There is a minimal waiting list that 
is managed by the State.  The State 
reports that they usually know which 
providers have openings or funding 
available to serve someone and have 
ready means for locating services for 
people in crisis situations. 
 
Each DA maintains a waiting list.  
The State specifies criteria for 
waiting list and requires the DA to 
submit monthly updates via a secure 
website to assure appropriate 
allocations.   
 
The State maintains a central waiting 
list.  Rules require that the State 
alternate between funding the person 
with the most severe needs based on 
their service and funding the person 
who has been on the waiting list the 
longest. 
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Ohio 
Individual Options Waiver 
South Dakota 
Comprehensive DD Waiver 
Vermont 
Waiver for Persons with DD 
Wyoming 
Adult DD Waiver 
Stakeholder Involvement 
Consumers participate on the State 
Quality Management Advisory 
Council (QMAC) and are otherwise 
involved in waiver renewals and 
grant activities pertaining to the 
waiver program. 
The State has program workgroups 
involving consumers. In addition, 
consumers participate in designing a 
pilot project to develop a method to 
offer consumers a choice with 
service coordination.   
State Program Standing Committee 
appointed by Governor includes 9-
15 members (majority are disclosed 
consumers and family members).  
Responsible for hiring key state 
management, evaluation of quality, 
development of State System of 
Care Plan, Policy, Review of 
aggregate complaints and grievances 
for trends. 
Majority of members of Local (DA) 
Program Standing Committee must 
be consumers or family members. 
DA must document 
consumer/family inclusion in 
reviews of services delivered, 
requests for services, quality 
monitoring, and evaluation of 
agency program effectiveness. 
 
 
The Division has an Advisory Council 
that includes representatives from the 
regional service providers, 
independent providers, 
participants/family members, 
Governor’s Planning Council for 
People with Developmental 
Disabilities, Protection & Advocacy, 
Wyoming Institute for Disabilities, 
Developmental Preschools and the 
Department of Education.  The 
Council meets at least twice a year 
and reviews the Division’s strategic 
plan, suggests changes to rules, 
regulations and policies, and reviews 
aggregate data on the service delivery 
system to identify gaps and make 
recommendations for changes.   
 
Division has a Working Group 
process where stakeholders are 
invited to participate in working 
groups that work on 
development/updating of rules, 
changes to current procedures or 
forms, and other special projects.  
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Appendix C 
 
?  Summary of Stakeholder Input 
 
? Keep What’s Working 
? The CCB as Single Point of Entry 
? Eligibility Determination & Resource Allocation 
? Waiting Lists 
? Case Management Services 
? Provider Selection Process 
? Consumer Choice & Control 
? Participant Complaints 
? Pressures on System 
? Provider Entry 
? The CCB as Organized Health Care Delivery System 
? The CCB’s Quality Assurance Role 
? Accountability 
? Consistency and Local Control 
? Political Context 
? Issues and Comments Outside of Scope 
 
 ?  Summary of Stakeholder Input 
 
The following narrative summarizes information gathered through: 
 
? A series of face-to-face interviews with ARC representatives, CCB trade associations, 
CCBs, parents, and participants conducted in Colorado, August 22 and 23, 2007. 
 
? Phone conversations with parents, case managers, provider representatives, Colorado’s 
protection and advocacy organization over the month of September. 
 
? Email communications from parents and some providers received during the month of 
September. 
 
This summary should be read with the understanding that we do not know the answers to the 
following questions:  
 
? Are the comments we received a fair representation of the views held by participants, 
parents, providers, etc.?  In fact, it is unlikely that the experience of the participants we 
interviewed fully represent the typical experience of the people served by CCBs.  In 
particular, we expect that many of the participants we met with had a relatively low level 
of service need; their relationship with their CCB is therefore likely to be less intensive 
than other participants might experience.  In addition, many of the participants we met 
with received state funded, not Medicaid funded services.  
 
We also heard concerns that some people are afraid to express their opinion for fear of 
retaliation.  In addition, some parents questioned whether the process for soliciting input 
was selective. 
 
? Are the positive and negative comments predominantly connected to just a subset of 
CCBs or can they be generalized across many?  A number of people we talked to, 
including advocates and CCB representatives, seemed to agree that the problems 
identified were associated with only three or four CCBs, although we do not know if they 
agreed on which CCBs.  We also heard complimentary comments about particular CCBs. 
 
? Is the information gathered an accurate representation of a problem, or is it skewed by 
that person’s understanding of the problem?  There may be cases where we can answer 
this question but not generally. 
 
Keep What’s Working 
We heard from many parents that any changes to the system should not interfere with what’s 
working.  Said one parent:  “If it works, don’t fix it!”   
 
For many, the system is working well.  Many fear how change will impact services that they 
depend on.  More than one parent shared the view that: “Without the funding we have 
received…we would be lost.”  Parents were worried about the potential for added costs and 
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 administrative burden reducing the amount available for services.  One person also worried that 
the familiarity of existing relationships would be lost if the current system were disrupted.   
 
 
The CCB as Single Point of Entry  
The CCB serves as the single point of entry for people who want to access DD services in their 
service area.  We asked stakeholders about the advantages and disadvantages of having the CCB 
serve as the single entry point to services.   
 
A number of stakeholders identified the positive roles a CCB can play: 
 
? The CCB is a “soft place to land” for parents just learning that their child has a disability.  
Several parents described the valuable role a CCB can play in helping parents adjust. 
 
? The CCB serves as the “face” of developmental disabilities in their community.  One 
parent cited the role that the CCB plays in building community connections, with the 
CCB as the known point of contact for working with the local community to address 
problems affecting the DD population.   
 
? Also because the CCB is known in the community, a CCB representative noted that 
CCBs serve as a primary contact for responding in an emergency situation.    
 
? Several stakeholders said the advantage of the CCB was having one place to go to get 
answers.  Some parents mentioned that the CCBs provided access to and information 
about the service and provider choices available to them.  One parent said “I like having 
one central place to coordinate placement, provider organizations, and other services for 
those with developmental disabilities.”  
  
? A case manager suggested that having a single point of entry for developmental disability 
services made it easier to coordinate with other single points of entry (e.g., the elderly, 
blind, disabled waiver). 
 
CCBs appear to vary in how they comply with the statutory requirement for an annual public 
meeting and annual plan.  One CCB reported combining the annual public meeting with a 
provider fair.   
 
Others questioned whether or not CCBs were visible access points: 
 
? Several parents thought that entry through the CCB is not obvious for people who are 
new to Colorado.  (This is compared to a number of parents reporting they were quickly 
linked to services when their child was born in Colorado.)   
 
? One advocate reported that the educational system does not always know to refer to a 
CCB; she saw this as a problem given that the educational system is responsible for 
educating the school system about how to access services.   
 
C3                 Muskie School of Public Service 
 There seemed to be some consensus that the visibility of the CCB, and its effectiveness as a 
single entry point depended on whether or not the CCB was located in a rural or urban 
community. 
 
People also worried about how much control the CCB had because it served as the single entry 
point: 
 
? One parent said that because the CCBs have a “captive audience” they are not motivated 
to provide objective information on available services.   
 
? One parent said the CCB “limits our options and puts us at the mercy of their 
effectiveness and bureaucracy.”  
 
? A case manager said the downside to having only one entry point in a service area was 
being stuck with the “personality” of your CCB.  
 
? A number of stakeholders said the CCB does not have an incentive to “think outside the 
box” to develop creative service solutions. 
 
Stakeholders discussed different strategies for addressing concerns about the CCB’s single entry 
point role: 
 
? The idea of providing independent information and referral was not seen as useful in rural 
areas, where the CCB is the only provider.  At the same time, one parent suggested that 
information and referral should be done by a provider who would make referral to 
generic supports (e.g., the YMCA); this parent said when information and referral is 
provided by a disability provider, referrals tend to be toward disability-specific services.  
 
? Several stakeholders, including parents, advocates, and CCB representatives, discussed 
the need for other options.  In Colorado, if a person is dissatisfied with his or her CCB, 
that person can request case management services from another CCB.  However, it was 
agreed that there were some serious logistical problems associated with that option.  First, 
the other CCB can deny the request.  Also, particularly in rural areas, the closest CCB 
can be a long distance away. 
 
Eligibility Determination & Resource Allocation. 
The CCB is responsible for determining whether a person is eligible for developmental disability 
services.  They also administer the level of care assessment for determining whether or not a 
person is eligible for waiver services.  CCBs are responsible for assessing an individual’s need 
for services in order to develop a service plan.  
 
One case manager said that the Level of Care (LOC) determination is subject to interpretation.  
Some CCBs are more liberal and others conservative.  Some people believe the CCB uses the 
eligibility determination process as a tool for screening people out if they are hard to serve.  One 
advocate said some CCBs are frequently overturned on appeal; while others apply the eligibility 
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 criteria much more loosely.  This advocate speculates that some CCBs are tightening up how 
they interpret eligibility to keep down their waiting lists.  
 
CCB representatives reported that the eligibility determination process has recently become 
muddied because a number of decisions have been overturned on appeal.  The CCBs believe that 
their determinations have followed the letter of the law but the administrative law judges (ALJs) 
have not. They believe the ALJs need better training or the Department needs to clarify that it 
has changed its eligibility criteria.  
 
Many agreed that Colorado’s plans to use a standardized assessment tool for allocating resources 
was a positive step in the right direction and would address some concerns around consistency.   
Many, including representatives of the CCBs, agreed that administering the SIS should be done 
by someone other than the CCB.  Advocates believed the CCBs would game the SIS.  Some 
CCB representatives believe they would be asked to game the SIS or would be accused of 
gaming the SIS, and wanted to stay away from that problem. 
 
Advocates, many parents, and some CCB representatives were comfortable with the idea of 
taking the functions for eligibility determination, level of care determination and the allocation of 
resources out of the CCB.  One parent noted that people have to go through the county to apply 
for Medicaid anyway, so it makes sense to have the county be the single entry point.  (Another 
parent had experience with both the Elderly, Blind, Disabled (EBD) waiver and the DDD HCBS 
waiver.  To this person, access to the EBD waiver system was very concrete and straightforward.  
For the DDD waiver, access is more complicated, vague, and “murkier.”)   
 
A number of parents and others worried that reassigning these functions would add another 
administrative layer and more costs, creating more bureaucracy and reducing the money for 
direct services.   
 
Waiting Lists 
A number of stakeholders expressed concern about how waiting lists are managed.  Some 
perceive the CCB playing favorites, moving board members, employees or favored parents up 
the list faster.  Some parents were dissatisfied with the case management services available to 
them while on the waiting list; that the CCB makes no effort to connect a person to services 
outside of those within the CCB’s domain.   
 
The CCBs say that they are not paid to manage waiting lists and are paid very little for case 
management services for those on the waiting list.   
 
Some thought that there needed to be more transparency and consistency in the way waiting lists 
are managed.  The idea of centralizing the management of waiting lists would raise concerns if 
that meant that all CCB waiting lists were merged into one:  some were concerned that people in 
rural areas would essentially be shut out of services, given the higher volume in cities.   
 
Case Management Services 
Parents had a lot to say about the quality of case management services.  Many parents see their 
case manager as having their child’s best interests at heart.  A number of people were able to 
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 describe the personalized and effective role that a case manager had played in addressing their 
child’s needs: 
 
? “The people we dealt with at every level were kind, caring and professional individuals.” 
 
? “[My son’s case managers] are caring, meticulous and sensitive to the needs of both the 
clients and families of the client!” 
 
? “I find that the case managers for my ward consistently place his needs before those of 
the agency by whom they are employed and ensure that the his needs are met, his rights 
as an individual are protected and that he is given the opportunity to succeed as an 
individual.” 
 
? [Our CCB] stepped in…and provided very caring, skilled representatives who helped us 
navigate some difficult territories.”   
 
? “[Our care manager] was right there the whole time working with our schedule and 
making sure that [our son] received the required help.” 
 
? “I am certain my life has been repeatedly graced by the endurance, tension holding and 
sustained focus of [my son’s] numerous case managers….   
 
? They have always been helpful and conscientious in their work.  We find that they are the 
most client-friendly of any agency we deal with.” 
 
One parent noted that her child’s case manager was not familiar with her child’s condition but 
was willing to learn.  Some parents said their own skills as an advocate for their child left a 
minimal role for their case manager, but they could turn to their CCB when they had a problem.  
One parent said she and her case manager would not always agree but they work as a team and 
make the best decisions under the circumstances.  She said she is comfortable challenging 
decisions with her case manager’s boss.  One parent described the role her CCB played in 
teaching her to be an advocate for her child, providing funding and respite so that she could 
attend training and support groups.   
 
Other parents had less favorable things to say about their case manager.  Several described their 
case manager as “not very helpful,” or inexperienced, or nonresponsive. Some parents shared 
stories about instances in which their case manager’s failure to give them correct information had 
resulted in lost funding or a lost opportunity to access services.  Another parent said his child has 
had six case managers in the last year and half.  This parent said these case managers have not 
observed his child in any other context except in the case manager’s office, so do not have a 
good understanding of his child’s needs.   
 
Others comments include: 
 
? “[H]ere is what is missing in case management:  Plans that have goals and solutions in 
them with direction on where to apply for what is needed.  We are on the wait list so our 
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 case manager really is only supposed to meet with us twice a year to discuss what we will 
do with family support funds (which is a couple hundred dollars a month).  Nobody talks 
to us about what we can do outside the CCB system.  There is no plan.  No direction at 
all, when there could be.  Some people could end up not even needing supported living 
and comp services if they did that because there are other resources.  So a plan should 
include how to apply for Section 8 vouchers, how to connect with Voc Rehab for job 
services, etc., to address the needs of an adult who wants to live on their own and work!  I 
am constantly learning new things from other people, not my case manager.  (I found out 
my son did not have to use Ticket to Work to work with Voc Rehab again – and that now 
I am wasting his Ticket to Work money!) I told my case manager that my son wanted 
more education.  She sent me a list of community colleges, etc.  But I told her when I met 
with her recently that what she doesn’t know about that is that my son (because he has an 
IEP) can’t be in a degree program, can’t get the accommodations he needs, etc.  So those 
schools may work with people in wheelchairs, etc., and my son could audit classes, but to 
what end?  How does that translate into a job?...[N]obody seems to be understanding that 
all resources should be considered for each individual and a plan should be based on what 
is available to them at the time to achieve their goals…so they don’t wallow away in 
quiet desperation….”   
 
? “My daughter’s case manager has been changed 7-8 times in the last 10 years at least.  
And not to different people [because of] turnover, but switched around to the same 3-4 
people over and over.  And she isn’t a difficult case at all.  We get contacted once a year, 
when it’s time for her IP.  But these will be the people the state and the CEO will listen to 
when it comes time to make decisions about her care.” 
 
? “I don’t get a lot of input from my worker as to what is out there for my son.  I have to be 
on top of it, I have to be the one to search for resources.”  This parent said the CCB’s role 
is not “personal.” It is playing a “clinical” or “administrative” role. 
 
Parents also identified some of the problems impacting case managers and suggested additional 
supports: 
 
? Some parents recommended better training for case managers.   
 
? One parent mentioned the importance of a good supervisor.   
 
? Parent representatives also identified poor pay as a factor contributing to the quality of 
case management, with poor pay contributing to turnover.   
 
? Parents and CCB representatives cited the additional administrative burden created by 
recent reforms as another factor affecting the quality of case management services and 
turnover rates. 
 
CCB representatives report that case managers are leaving their jobs because of the added 
bureaucracy resulting from recent reforms.  
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 Other parents talked about own their role as advocates for their children as a way to complement 
the services provided by their case manager.  They said the family or participant needs to take 
responsibility for exploring all the options.  Some thought that strong parental advocacy was 
important for getting their child what was needed, while at the same time saying that it shouldn’t 
matter who you are or what you know, everyone should be treated the same.   
  
For the participants interviewed, the role of the case manager appears to be very limited.  
Participants reported that they meet with their case manager only once per year, when it is time 
to develop their IP.  Case managers can also be involved “when there’s a problem,” but they 
were not the first person called by any of the participants interviewed.  (It should be noted that 
the utilization patterns of the people interviewed are very possibly not representative of those 
receiving services.)  Not all participants were happy with their case managers.  One member 
objected to the barrier that her case manager and her guardian presented when it came to 
choosing services based on her preference.   
 
One advocate reported that the State used to have annual case meetings for case managers, which 
was a way for the State to stay connected.  That program has been continued and no other 
mechanism exists for maintaining contact with case managers.  
 
Provider Selection Process 
Advocates, CCB representatives, parent representatives and participants all had a similar 
understanding of the provider selection process as it should work:  The case manager works with 
the individual to identify needed services and identifies available providers.   For those that do 
not already have a preference for providers, the case manager drafts a profile of the individual.  
The profile is used to solicit interest among providers.  Providers participate in an RFP process 
and the case manager helps the individual learn more about potential providers in order to make 
an informed choice.   
 
Many reported experiences consistent with the ideal process: 
  
? All of the participants interviewed had a favorable impression of the provider selection 
process.  All recognized that a participant is not limited to the services offered by a CCB 
(unless the CCB is the only provider in the area).  Some reported that their case manager 
identified potential providers and set up interviews, so that they had an opportunity to 
meet with different providers before choosing.   
 
? Some parents reported that their CCB had been extremely helpful and helped them 
navigate a difficult process.  Several described the important role their case manager 
played in helping to develop a list of questions for prospective providers, so that they 
could make an informed choice.   
 
? One parent said her case manager helped her identify a range of providers that were 
better at serving people with her son’s needs.  A packet was sent to all of these agencies, 
and the parent and case manager interviewed the providers together.  The case manager 
had helped her develop questions for these interviews and identify what to look for given 
her son’s specialized needs.  The case manager did not sway her in her decision.  One of 
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 the service agencies under consideration was part of the CCB.  She said her case manager 
helped her come to the conclusion that the CCB’s service agency did not have the right 
capacity to serve her son.   
 
For others, the provider selection process has not worked as well.  Some parents reported that 
they were guided to the CCB’s services and that they had a hard time finding out about other 
options.  Some parents said their CCB publicized only their own services so that people, not 
knowing about any other options, come to the CCB with a preference for CCB services.  (When 
an individual already has a preferred provider, an RFP to other providers is not required under 
DDD rule.)   
 
? One parent described a meeting held by her CCB as follows:  "The meeting was 
advertised as parent information on the [comprehensive] waiver.  I was particularly 
interested in going to the meeting to find out what housing options were available.  When 
it got to that part of the meeting addressing housing options, I noticed that one particular 
housing community that I knew about wasn't mentioned.  Since this was my first foray 
into exploring the possibilities for my child, I was a little confused that I didn't hear the 
name of the provider I was aware of.  I specifically asked if there were any other housing 
options.  The answer was no, these are the ones we have (a technically correct answer, as 
these were the residential options managed by the CCB--but not really the answer I was 
seeking).  After the meeting, I asked about the housing option I was aware of, and the 
presenter said that this meeting was for the services offered by the CCB.  It was stated 
that there would be a meeting at a different time with information on other providers 
(which I have never seen a flyer about - and it has been almost a year since the meeting I 
attended.)  It is possible that I missed the notice for the additional meeting." 
 
? One parent raised questions about a newsletter advertising one of the CCB’s service 
programs.  This parent wondered if that service agency had paid for advertising in the 
CCB’s newsletter or whether other service providers had been offered a similar 
opportunity to advertise in the newsletter.   
 
? Another person, objecting to a flyer inviting parents to a forum about the CCB service 
programs, expressed the view that it is inappropriate for a CCB receiving public funding 
(including mil-levy funding) to provide access to services to spend that public funding on 
advertising only for its own services.  This person wondered if this CCB would be 
distributing information about other providers.    
 
? One parent said tracking down information about providers was confusing.  She did not 
know if she had a complete list of providers, which included only 40 service agencies 
while she knew her CCB contracted with over 100 independent contractors.  
 
? The provider listing on DDD’s website was seen as a positive move, but some did not 
think it was sufficiently family friendly or publicized.  Discussing the lack of clarity in 
the listing, one parent said: “It would be great to have a ‘yellow pages’ service directory 
for the CCBs.  Then I could look under transportation and here are all the providers, and 
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 here are the day programs and here are the residences and here are the providers that do 
community access.” 
 
? Some parents were frustrated by the fact that the CCB could only hand them a list of 
providers but could not tell them about their quality.  They saw the need for tools to help 
the parent evaluate provider quality.  One provider suggested that CCBs hand over the 
list without more support as a way to steer people into the CCBs services:  people are 
given the option of the CCB’s services or handed a list to sort through on their own.  
 
Case managers had mixed experience with the provider selection process.  One said that as long 
as you keep in mind the needs of families and participants, it is not a problem to be objective in 
the provider selection process.  One case manager said it is sometimes easier to identify the 
weakness of the CCB providers than other agencies.   
 
Another case manager found it very difficult to be objective.  She reported that case managers at 
her CCB were pushed to fill openings for the CCB’s service providers.  She said clients are only 
occasionally given a list of all available providers.  She said that if a participant or family 
member comes in preferring another provider, the IP meeting is about why they did not choose 
the CCB’s services.  She reported that the administrative office manages the provider selection 
process; she does not know which providers are solicited; she does not know if she sees all 
responses or if they have been screened.  The case manager’s job primarily is to process claims 
and monitor service plan implementation. This case manager reported working at other CCBs 
and not experiencing the same pressure.  She reported that there is very little separation 
administratively between the service agencies and case management services; nor is there 
separation in the eyes of the consumer walking in the door.  Case management and the service 
providers are located in the same building, and sometimes across the hall from each other.   
 
A provider also talked about the blurred lines between the case management services and other 
services.  Often, without other information to clarify the relationship, people are referred to the 
CCB’s services as the only option available to them.   In questioning the effectiveness of the 
“firewall” between case management and direct services, this provider said: “If you still have the 
ability to confuse people, how good is your firewall?” 
  
Other concerns about the provider selection process: 
 
? Advocates and parents reported that they were not given an opportunity to review the 
individual profile before it was shared with providers.  Some parents said the profile 
should be strengths based but is often negative. 
  
? A number of stakeholders expressed concern that the CCB bypasses the RFP process by 
selectively referring people to their own service providers.  A provider reported her 
understanding that the planning meeting involves the CCB’s “sales people,” who when a 
need is identified, say “We can take care of that” and the individual is never given a list 
of other options.  Or, in response to a request for employment services, a case manager 
says: “Let me put you in touch with our Employment Services.”  One case manager 
reported a specific example of a CCB bypassing the RFP process.  The CCB legitimately 
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 placed people in residential services in an emergency and then kept them there without 
opening up the long term placement to other providers. 
 
? Advocates believe the CCBs are selective in who they solicit interest from, rewarding 
providers in the CCB’s “good graces” and steer people to the CCB’s own services.  From 
their perspective, CCBs reward providers who do not complain about rates or make 
referrals to the ARCs.   
 
? Some saw the CCB redirecting the harder to serve to other service providers.  The 
advocates see case managers as responsible for limiting the CCB’s liability, and “cherry 
picking” the easier to serve, rather than finding the best match between participant and 
provider.    
 
Other comments on the provider selection process: 
 
? Some people saw themselves as having the right to advocate for more choice.   
 
? Some people thought the problem was less about lack of information about choices than 
it was the lack of choices, or service options, for people with specialized needs.   
 
? One parent objected to the perceived premise underlying the provider selection and RFP 
process.  For this parent, the CCB should be developing a program to meet a participant’s 
needs rather than finding the program the participant fits into best.  The individualized 
plan is supposed to be unique, with needs met through a variety of service agencies.  
Instead, standard services are offered “as close as we can get” to individualized need.  
Another parent agreed, saying provider selection is about “what’s most convenient,” even 
if it means fitting a round peg into a square hole.  Other parents saw it easier to be 
flexible and individualize services in rural areas.   
 
? One parent thought that providers don’t have enough information to decide whether to 
respond to an RFP because the amount of funding allocated to an individual is not 
specified.  This concern may be addressed by the standard rates to be implemented by the 
Department.  
 
? Some parents said they had a lot of provider choices but have trouble finding quality 
providers.  Some said quality was an issue for rural areas 
 
CCB representatives agreed that there may be inconsistency in how the provider selection 
process plays out for different CCBs.  They agreed that there was a need for consistent standards 
for how to document adherence to this process.  Some of their suggestions: 
 
? Standardize the provider selection process and create more transparency in RFP process.  
 
? Standardize what the case manager says in the provider selection process; require 
participant to sign a document to acknowledge that they were informed about options. 
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 ? Standardize what the case manager says about participant rights and advocates; require 
participant to sign a document to acknowledge that they were informed about options. 
 
CCB representatives refute the claim that CCBs cream the easiest to serve.  CCB representatives 
see the CCBs as the “provider of last resort,” serving the hardest to serve participants.  One CCB 
representative reported that his CCB decided to provide services only because previously his 
CCB had been “held hostage” when negotiating with service providers over rates and placement.  
Another CCB representative offered to produce data showing that his case managers refer to 
other service providers at a much higher rate than to services provided by his CCB.   
 
CCB representatives do not believe that CCBs play favorites among providers.  One CCB 
representative reported that his CCB has been accused of favoritism even when it was not 
providing a competing service.  In his eyes, the case manager provider is always susceptible to 
that claim.   
 
In rural Colorado many CCBs are the only service provider.  One rural CCB representative 
reports that he would welcome other providers in his community; he reports, however, that 
previous attempts have failed because he is not able to guarantee sufficient numbers of 
participants. (One provider mentioned the challenges of expanding to a rural community if the 
CCB is unwilling to work with the new provider.) 
 
Consumer Choice and Control 
The issue of consumer choice and control came up in a number of different ways.   
 
Some parents mentioned their own experience with consumer directed services and the State’s 
plans for expanding these options: 
 
? Parents and participants discussed an earlier taskforce which had issued a series of 
recommendations for consumer directed services.  Parents saw CMS’ interventions as 
sidelining these recommendations.  Parent representatives said they would like to see 
consumer direction as part of every waiver.   
 
? One parent expressed disappointment that the person centered planning pilot project in 
her area had come to an end.  She saw the use of person centered planning and direct 
funding as ideal for her son.  Now he participates in the traditional annual IP meeting, 
where “almost everyone but my son has input and say in the plan.”  Also, the funding for 
services is reduced with the administrative costs associated with traditional services.  
 
? Another parent described her arrangement under the SLS waiver, saying that she had 
complete control over how her daughter’s funds are spent and what providers work for 
her.  Her CCB serves as the employer of record and processes payroll. She “orders” 
services online each month.  She can select among approved providers, including family-
recruited providers.  This parent believed that expanding this model to other parts of the 
State would “address some of the conflict issues and create competition that should drive 
quality and innovation.  A completely consumer-driven model without CCB intervention 
should also be made available to participants/families who want to take on the 
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Some parents report that some CCB directors discourage people from the idea of consumer 
directed services, suggesting that there will be no recourse if there is a problem.    A provider 
said that CCBs do not want families to know that they can be their own case manager under the 
SLS waiver; they tell them that emergency funds will not be available if there is a problem.   
 
A number of stakeholders shared the view that the lack of a consumer directed option 
strengthened the CCB’s hold on the system; participants are bound to the case management and 
referral practices of their CCB.   
 
One parent cautioned that self determination will work for some people but not others and that 
other options should be available. 
 
Other stakeholders talked about the need for more control over decision making generally: 
 
? At least one parent expressed frustration about the CCBs and their case manager’s 
“unilateral control” over decisions, in which the parent is informed “here’s what’s been 
done” without an opportunity to weigh in.  
 
? Another parent wrote:  “[My CCB] has had a stranglehold on services for as many years 
as I can remember.  It is the one stop where you get told what services they provide, 
which services you can have (regardless of what you might NEED) and where you can 
get them.”   
 
? Another parent said “I’m tired of being told that a stranger, someone who is paid to be in 
my daughter’s life, knows more about what is good for her than I do.  Someone with no 
relationship with her can come in and make decisions for her, and her family for that 
matter, without even knowing them.”   
 
? One parent talked about the fact that families are left out of the loop in managing their 
child’s budget.  She does not review the provider contracts, get a monthly statement, see 
payment rates or bills.  Nor does she know whether a worker has been paid.  This parent 
thought this information would be helpful for better managing how her child’s resources 
are managed.   
 
? Advocates reported that the CCB, having control over access to services, can place 
demands on participants and deny services when a person does not meet those demands.  
They saw this as one strategy for limiting the CCB’s liability for “difficult” participants.  
One advocate cited the example of a person presumed to be sexually dangerous who was 
denied services because the individual refused to participate in a behavioral program.   
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 A number of parents and advocates talked about how the lack of consistency across CCBs limits 
consumer choice and control.  Because eligibility, resource allocation, and payment rates 
decisions vary across CCBs, when a person wants to move from one catchment area to another, 
“everything changes.”  The uncertainty connected to whether or not a person will lose services, 
inhibits a participant’s choice to move.   
 
Participant Complaints 
Many people talked about the ability of participants and families to make complaints.  An 
advocate noted it is often very difficult for a person with developmental disabilities to advocate 
for him or herself.  As a result, it is important for people with developmental disabilities to have 
someone who can help them navigate or connect them into the complaint process.   While some 
were satisfied with the way things worked, others saw problems.   
 
The participants interviewed talked about their own experiences advocating for themselves.  
While many people agreed that it is was important to speak up, many found it hard to so:  some 
participants reported that they are afraid to speak up.  Some reported that they are shy, or don’t 
know how to say what they want to say, they are afraid of saying something wrong, or they are 
afraid what they say will “come back at them later.”  One person said it is intimidating speaking 
up to people in higher positions.  Another person said if they speak up, they are afraid they will 
be “mowed down.”   
 
Many parents also talked about their fears about speaking up: 
 
? A number of parents discussed their fear of retaliation.  One parent said that there are no 
checks and balances on the CCB, and parents are reluctant to “bite the hand that feeds 
you.”  One parent saw the participant profile, used to solicit interest among providers, as 
one mechanism for retaliating against a parent that complains. The CCB will negatively 
describe your child to discourage responses.  In her case, she reported that provider 
agencies often reported that her son was not as challenging as the CCB had described him 
in his profile. 
   
? Some said parents are either “in or out” with the CCBs or the Department, depending on 
how much trouble they are.  If you are out, you do not receive notices, you are not invited 
to be on boards, you do not move up on the waiting list, etc.   
 
? One parent said that concern about retaliation is greater in the adult service system where 
services are not an entitlement and can be more easily pulled.  
 
From the CCB perspective, the allegations of retaliation are particularly frustrating.  They see 
themselves as unable to address complaints when they are made anonymously, but the 
complainant will not come forward for fear of retaliation.  CCB representatives acknowledge that 
there must be fear of retaliation among some participants and families but have not seen 
documented evidence.  They reported that only a very small fraction of complaints last year 
included allegations of retaliation.  They also noted that some people will perceive retaliation 
when services are terminated or reduced, even when the reduction in services is related to budget 
cuts not retaliation.   
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One advocate said that the complaint process is not an adequate safeguard for developmental 
disability services.  This advocate said people with developmental disabilities often need 
assistance in advocating for themselves or need someone to advocate on their behalf.  A number 
of people discussed what can be an uncomfortable role for a case manager who is advocating on 
behalf of a participant and challenging the CCB.  Advocates see case managers as intimidated by 
their employers, the CCBs, limiting their freedom to advocate on behalf of the people they serve.  
The advocates wonder why more case managers are not filing appeals to help get services; they 
report that a case manager is put in the position of appealing to his or her boss to not reduce 
services.  One advocate said only a handful of case managers are willing to stand up for their 
client.   
 
The challenges of advocating against their employer were confirmed by a number of case 
managers interviewed.  We heard from more than one person about how difficult it is to advocate 
on behalf of a participant against the CCB; that the participant is left without a strong advocate.  
At the same time, one case manager, finding no satisfaction from her CCB brought her concern 
to the State.  She acknowledged that others might not feel comfortable with that approach.     
 
Some sources said that CCBs also discourage access to external advocates, including the ARCs: 
 
? According to an ARC representative, at least one CCB has told providers in its service 
area to stop calling the ARC, that they should call each other to figure things out.  The 
advocates report that the CCBs do their own investigations into abuse and neglect and 
believe the local social services agency blesses their findings.  
 
? One parent reported that a CCB tried to cancel a provider’s contract accusing the provider 
of being a disruptive force by inappropriately advocating for its clients.  In the eyes of the 
provider, it was a matter of holding the CCB accountable. 
 
Many also identified problems with the way complaints are resolved.  
 
? Advocates report that the review at the CCB level is potentially biased by the fact that 
CCB directors appoint themselves as the impartial hearing officer, based on the 
understanding that they were not directly involved in the underlying dispute. 
     
? Some parents reported that appearing before the administrative law judge is intimidating.   
 
The CCB representatives noted that the mediation process recently developed has hardly been 
used.  Several people advocated that there needed to be a different, independent pathway for 
making a complaint, so that the complaint does not fall back on the head of the person making 
the complaint.   
 
Of the participants interviewed, none said they called their case manager as their first step in 
addressing a problem.  In general, people go to their provider or their family and friends, before 
they go to their case manager.  At least one person reported that the anticipated delay in response 
time was one reason why she did not call her case manager.  In addition, it’s likely that because 
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 this group only met with their case manager once a year, they did not see their case manager as 
the place to go for help with a problem.   
 
Pressures on the System 
Many stakeholders talked about the challenges presented by the shortage of funding for services.  
Funding shortages were blamed for a number of problems: 
 
? Waiting lists:  CCB representatives reported that there are very long waiting lists for 
services (reportedly ranging from 10-20 years to 150 years).   
 
? High caseloads:  CCB representatives reported that case managers have very high 
caseloads and that the CCBs get paid very little relative to the services provided.  One 
CCB representative reported that he subsidizes his case management services with other 
funding sources, including the mil levy.  He said the State pays to provide case 
management to 300 people and he is able to provide case management to 900.  CCB 
representatives reported that they do not get paid for managing waiting lists. 
 
? Unhappiness:  CCBs say that funding shortages mean they have to make hard choices 
which lead to unhappiness.  They see rural CCBs as having an easier time being flexible, 
since the problem of creating precedent is less where there are fewer people.  A number 
of parents reported that satisfaction with services is very likely tied to whether or not 
your child is receiving services as an adult or child.  The range of services is greater for 
children so parents tend to be more satisfied.  The pressure of finding services for an 
adult creates greater frustration with the system. 
 
A number of families described the challenges they face while they wait for services or because 
needed services are not available, including therapies, employment support, respite, etc.  One 
parent shared her gratitude for the progress her son had made because of the early intervention 
services he had received and explained that, had her son been born a year later, he would not 
received the same services because of funding cuts.  She said children are now going without 
needed early intervention services.  One parent noted that the waiting lists are so long you need 
to be poor or in crisis in order to get services. 
 
Provider Entry 
Previously the CCB had a role in controlling provider entry into their catchment area.  That 
policy was changed recently so that the CCB is responsible for reviewing a provider application 
for completeness and submitting it to DDD for approval.   
 
Prior to the recently policy change, providers objected to the inconsistent criteria used by CCBs 
for approving or disapproving a provider’s entry into its service area.  In some cases, a provider 
would be approved by one CCB and denied by another.  The recent policy change does not 
eliminate the variation in a CCB’s criteria for approving a provider.  However, with recent 
changes, a provider approved by one CCB is now approved to provide services throughout the 
State.     
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 One provider said a CCB’s unwillingness to work with an approved provider can be another 
effective barrier to provider entry in rural areas.  The CCBs believe that recent changes have 
minimized their role relative to approving provider entry.  They see the role of the CCB as purely 
an administrative pass through of the required paper work.  They see this change as a having a 
negative effect on their ability to assure the quality of providers in their service area.  The ability 
of a provider to expand to other service areas is viewed as a negative, with questions raised about 
the adequacy of state review of expansion letters.  CCB representative say it is in the CCB’s 
interest to have a lot of service options in their area, mitigating any incentive to block entry.   
 
The CCB as Organized Health Care Delivery System  
Although recent reforms have reduced the role of the organized health care delivery system 
(OHCDS), a provider representative reports that providers see several advantages to joining an 
OHCDS.  The CCB provides a billing service attractive to smaller providers unequipped to 
manage billing under Medicaid.  Billing through the CCB also offers greater security on cash 
flow, as compared to direct billing to Medicaid.  Also, the OHCDS is viewed as a buffer in the 
event that problems that arise, because the CCB is the accountable entity.  Providers also believe 
that participation in an OHCDS puts them in a favorable position for receiving referrals and for 
benefiting from mil-levy funding.  One provider said fear of retaliation is the primary reason for 
participating in an OHCDS; she said providers are afraid that the small amount of referrals they 
do get will go away if they do not participate.   
 
Some CCB representatives saw this shift as a short-term policy change made in response to 
direction from CMS.  These representatives thought the service system would move back to an 
OHCDS model, believing CMS and states would find fee-for-service unsustainable over time.  
For this reason, one CCB representative believed there is still value for a CCB to maintain the 
OHCDS relationships developed before the reforms were implemented.  CCBs also see a 
contractual relationship as the most expedient mechanism for addressing quality issues.  In the 
absence of a contract, which can be pulled for a violation, the CCB has to wait for the State to 
intervene.  The State often is more cautious in making interventions.  At the county level, the 
social service agencies are seen as understaffed and not able to make timely responses.   
 
One person provided an example of how a CCB favored itself in establishing reimbursement 
rates.  In this case, a provider had requested an adjustment to negotiated rates in response to a 
change in a client’s conditions.  The CCB denied the request and as a result, the provider was no 
longer able to meet the individual’s needs and the contract was terminated.  The client was then 
referred to a CCB provider agency and the rates were increased to cover the additional services 
needed.  Many agreed that Colorado’s effort to develop standardized rates would address some 
concerns around consistency and transparency.   
 
CCB representatives reported that they are limited on the fees that they charge for SLS and that 
audits would show noncompliance with these limits.  On the other hand, according to CCB 
representatives, service providers submit financial statements but CCBs do not know how 
service providers spend their money.   
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 The CCB’s Quality Assurance Role  
The CCB is responsible for overseeing the quality of service agencies, including its own service 
agencies. The CCBs saw themselves as having a strong role in regulating themselves.  Some see 
the “corporate culture” as an important determinant of quality:  there needs to be a top down 
message from leadership that the participant is at the center of services.  They also said CCBs 
can (and do) take responsibility for bringing up the quality of other CCBs, by sharing best 
practices.    
 
The CCBs identified a series of QA mechanism that they use to monitor quality including:  
independent satisfaction surveys, trend reports on incidents, investigations (which provide direct 
reports to the CCB board), complaints, and spot surveys.   
 
We heard from a number of stakeholders about concerns that CCBs were very good at 
addressing quality concerns for other service agencies, but were less responsive when it was their 
own service agency.  A provider suggested that CCBs can use the quality assurance function to 
retaliate against providers, by nit picking.  She said the company she contracts with is her direct 
competitor; as a result she is held to a different standard.  One case manager said, when it comes 
to monitoring services, other service agencies are very responsive but she has little leverage to 
make things happen with the CCB’s providers; she often experiences a lot of resistance to 
making changes she proposes; this case manager said the CCB she works for suppressed 
something that should have been a reported incident, saying “Let’s move forward.”  Another 
case manager described the subtle effect of personal relationships developed by working in the 
same location. “They’re in the lunchroom together every day,” making it more difficult for the 
case management side of the CCB to challenge the performance of the provider side.  We also 
heard concerns that CCBs favor contracted providers (providers billing through the CCB, and 
paying a fee for that service) over independent providers (providers billing directly to the State).  
 
A provider representative expressed concern about the lack of consistency across CCBs.  CCBs 
are required to submit their monitoring plans to the Department but providers note there is no 
standard process or format for these plans.  Agencies can be monitored by multiple CCBs, with 
potentially different expectations and potentially different outcomes and issues raised.  This 
person said there is also variation in the requirements coming from the different Human Rights 
Committees associated with each CCB.  Some require major documentation and others minimal 
evidence in others.  In the eyes of this provider, CCBs have been delegated authority with limited 
standardization and transparency, leading to significant variations in practice.  They are viewed 
by providers as quasi-regulatory, without strong central oversight.  This person believes that the 
State should take a stronger role in imposing standards and insisting on transparent practices in 
operation and quality oversight.   
 
Advocates thought the CCB should not have a quality assurance function over its own service 
agencies or other service agencies.   
 
CCB representatives thought it was very important for the CCB to have some control over the 
quality of providers operating in their catchment area.  The CCBs see themselves as playing an 
important QA role, providing technical assistance and monitoring services.  CCBs also reported 
that the CCB has a strong incentive to be on top of the quality of all providers, whether its own, 
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 contracted, or independent.  When providers fail the CCB is held responsible for finding 
alternative services and can be held liable for any injury resulting from a poor quality provider.  
In the eyes of the CCBs interviewed, the CCB holds itself to a higher level of accountability 
when it also provides services.  They also report that their own case managers are some of the 
toughest critics of services provided by the CCB and that the division between case management 
is very real within the CCBs represented.  CCB representatives believe that the DDD onsite 
survey would catch any favoritism were it to exist.  They are not aware of any documented cases 
of favoritism toward contracted providers.   
 
Advocates see the Human Rights Committee as a “rubber stamp” for CCB actions. They report 
that only the information provided by the CCB is provided to the HRC.  Also, advocates reported 
that those members who challenge the CCBs are “uninvited” as continued members.  Some 
parents also reported that there are some parents that are “in” with the CCBs that get invited to 
participate on the HRC or board but that those parents that are not “in” never receive an 
invitation.   One person reported that, as a member of a Human Rights Committee, he was in 
position to pass judgment on the care provided for many of the CCB’s clients; he said the CCB 
regularly proved itself to be an excellent provider.    
 
Some CCBs saw the need for a stronger hand from DDD.  Some of the improvements suggested 
by CCB representatives include: 
 
? Greater DDD involvement in incident investigations; DDD should be reviewing incident 
reports. 
 
? DDD should respond to legitimate issues and questions raised by families and 
participants. 
 
? Faster response from DDD in emergencies; the CCB has to write a report and can wait 1-
3 weeks for a response from the State, during which the situation is not corrected.  The 
CCBs see themselves as the party held accountable. 
 
? Stronger leadership from DDD; more willingness to take the heat.  DDD should have a 
wider range of tools for regulating CCBs; right now DDD has only a big stick or no stick.   
 
? DDD conducts all satisfaction surveys, so that the surveys are seen as independent of 
CCB influence. 
 
Advocates regretted changes to DDD’s onsite survey process. In the past advocates participated 
in these surveys.  Advocate representatives saw value in having an independent set of eyes to 
identify potential problems.  Also, advocates reported that the participant evaluation of services 
is facilitated by the case manager or the service provider, creating a potential barrier to accurate 
and honest participant feedback. They report that there is anecdotal evidence that the participant 
evaluations are manipulated.   
 
Accountability 
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 We heard a wide range of comments from parents and advocates encouraging more transparency 
and accountability for CCBs.  
 
? One parent thought it was important for the salaries of CCB executive directors to be 
publicly available, making the board of directors more accountable for salary decisions.  
Several parents raised concerns about the salaries of executive directors, expressing 
concern about how tax dollars were being spent and who makes decisions about salaries.  
 
? One parent identified a series of concerns about a CCB’s accountability.  Beginning with 
her concern that her CCB provided full day programs to the children of employees, she 
asked:  “How do services get divvied out?  Who makes those decisions?  It feels like 
those committees, there to protect us, are hand picked by those who are holding the purse 
strings.  How about a more fair selection process?  Who is monitoring the hand picked 
committees….?  When asked for documentation on how the services or funding is 
divided, they don’t provide policies/procedures—even though they will you tell you they 
do.  Same thing when asked for a copy of the budget, it’s not available, can’t have it, 
can’t get it.” 
 
? A number of comments relate to how funding decisions are made:  “We constantly hear 
the problem is with funding.  However, why won’t they show us where the money comes 
from and where it goes?”  “[T]here is no transparency in the finances so it is hard to tell 
the cost of the services being provided or how much has been spent.”  One parent 
reported having to cut back on services although the amount of money available to his 
child is the same.  He attributed this reduction to higher charges from his CCB. 
 
? One parent suggested that families receive an Explanation of Benefit, so they can monitor 
what is being claimed for services.  Access to this information would also make it easier 
to manage the choices they are making. 
 
One parent objected to the recent changes connected accountability.  While recognizing the need 
for accountability, she believes the CCB must be able to serve its clients without the 
accountability process interfering.  She hopes her CCB will not have to continue to say “Mother 
may I?” for routine fiscal decisions, including approval of a $50 recreational class for her son.  
This parent was confident that her CCB had adequate internal accountability mechanisms in 
place before these recent reforms were made.   
 
Some CCB representatives agreed that there is a need for greater standardization and 
transparency in how CCBs operate.   
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Consistency and Local Control 
More than once Colorado’s CCB delivery system was described as “twenty different systems 
operating in twenty different ways.”  Said one parent:  “It’s the luck of the drawer where you 
live.” 
 
Some of these differences are procedural, e.g., how eligibility criteria are applied, how waiting 
lists are managed, how the provider selection process is managed.  One person reported that one 
CCB, responsible for determining eligibility for the CES waiver, had determined that no child in 
its region met CES waiver requirements.  She reported that she knew that not to be the case and 
her organization helped to get this waiver implemented in this area. 
 
Other differences seem to be philosophical.  One parent described making a choice about where 
to live based on one CCB’s practices relating to segregated, rather than integrated, services. 
 
Others are cultural.  To a large extent, cultural differences appear to be driven by the urban or 
rural nature of the community.  Many parents talked about the flexibility and responsiveness of 
CCBs in rural communities.  One parent having personal experience in both urban and rural 
settings, described urban services as “overwhelming.”  Participants are “almost treated like a 
number,” with the question being what they can provide not what is available in the community.  
In the rural area where he now lives, services are responsive and personalized, and the CCB and 
the local community have taken creative approaches to develop employment opportunities and 
fundraise.   
 
The quality and availability of services was also identified as another difference.  Some saw this, 
too, as connected to whether in a rural or urban community.  For example, one parent said it is 
generally harder to find employment opportunities for participants in rural areas.  Some parents 
complained that quality providers are harder to find in rural areas.  
 
Many advocated for greater standardization across CCBs.  CCB representatives also recognized 
the need for great consistency and transparency.  At the same time, a number of parents and CCB 
representatives expressed strong preference for preserving the local presence of a CCB and 
ability of a CCB to be flexible and responsive to individual needs.  This preference seemed 
particularly strong among those living in rural areas.   
 
Many also discussed Colorado’s strong preference for “local control.”  The need for local control 
was explained by the diversity of needs across Colorado.  Because some CCBs operate in urban 
centers and others in large tracts of rural land, they encounter very different community 
resources and provider costs.  State government was described as “detached.”  CCB 
representatives believe that regional delivery of services would be a “disaster” for rural services 
areas. 
 
According to one advocate, the public sees the CCB as a local community agency and do not 
believe the government should be able to tell it how to do business; but the CCB is providing a 
government service and needs to comply with federal and state law..  In this advocate’s eyes, 
many CCBs operate as fiefdoms.   
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Political Context 
In every interview, the role of politics was raised.  The trade associations rely on former 
legislators as lobbyists.  The CCBs include legislators on their boards.  The advocates call on 
legislators (and CMS or Health Care Policy and Finance) to step in when other avenues fail.  
Participants agreed that if you really need to be heard, you have to go to the legislature.  Some 
parents reported that they have been “shamed” for not going to the CCB first.   
 
The dialogue between advocates and CCBs was described as “toxic,” and interviews with each 
included allegations of inappropriate conduct on the others’ part.  Many saw the toxicity as tied 
to personalities.  In at least one case, however, the combative history between the ARC and the 
CCB seems to have carried over, even with changes in leadership and personalities. Advocate, 
CCB, and provider representatives expressed their belief that DDD’s ability (or willingness) to 
influence the political dialogue is limited and needs to be more active.      
 
Not all relationships between CCBs and ARCs are adversarial.  At least one CCB includes ARC 
representation on its board and CCB representation on the ARC board.  One CCB representative 
reported that he would welcome an ARC in his region, since it would relieve him of some 
advocacy responsibilities with, e.g., school districts.  However, previous attempts to start an 
ARC in his region have failed, probably because a critical mass of discontent does not exist in 
his region.  
 
Among parents there were also expressions of mistrust.  Some parents expressed fear of 
retaliation from parents who were also CCB board members or employed by the CCB.  On the 
other side, some parents reported that they did not feel free to speak up in front of parents who 
are strong critics of the CCBs.  One parent suggested that many parents resent outspoken critics 
of CCBs (such as herself) because “They are very worried they will lose the little morsels of help 
they do get.”   
 
CCB representatives report that close to 50% of board membership is composed of participants 
or parents or others interested in the field.  One parent said there were three to four parents on his 
CCB’s board, including him.  He said the board had diverse representation and good dialogue, 
with parents comfortable expressing their opinion.  Some parents believe that parents who are 
board members get preferential treatment, including moving up waiting lists faster.   
 
The CCBs cite improved relations between HCPF and DDD as a positive change and believe that 
many of the changes currently being implemented are correcting problems created by historically 
poor communication between the two agencies.   
 
Issues and Comments Outside of Scope 
The following issues and comments are outside the scope of our analysis.  They are recorded 
here for the benefit of the Department.   
 
? Advocates opposed using historical billing to set standards rates.  They believe CCBs have 
creamed the easiest to serve and have paid themselves the highest rates; assuming a CCB’s 
historical rates reflect their costs will inappropriately inflate their rates. 
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? Advocates raised the question of whether a CCB providing only case management services 
“can make a go of it.”  
 
? CCB representatives identified the need for emergency back up from the state.  They said 
they can’t get someone into a Regional Center without agreeing to take someone  else out.  
Currently there are no psych beds in Colorado; people are “treated” or restrained in 
emergency rooms. 
 
? Advocates reported that some people with a high level of need are refused services by the 
CCB and end up in prison even when the individual has not been convicted of crime.   
 
? One parent reported that a parent dissatisfied with the quality of services in a group home had 
been told that leaving the group home meant going to the bottom of the wait list.   
 
? One parent expressed concern about DDD spending money on systems change, new layers of 
bureaucracy and administrative costs.   
 
? Several parents mentioned problems connected with SSI.  
 
? One parent would prefer the CCB spend money on services, not bricks and mortar.   
 
? One parent advocated for more flexibility in tailoring services to need or changing need, with 
fewer layers of approval and paperwork. 
 
? A number of parents talked about their need for respite services.   
 
? One provider raised concerns about case managers who pick up extra work providing direct 
support to their clients, through another provider agency.  In that situation, the relationship 
between the case manager and service provider are so interconnected that the case manager 
cannot provide an independent assessment of case management and the service agency is in a 
difficult position monitoring the services provided by the person responsible for monitoring 
its services.
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